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I. Premilinary Remarks Conerning this Article and the Preexisting
Conceptions
1. A new conception of private international law is gathering strength 
an spreading around: the conception of private transnational law. Ehrenz- 
weig developped his Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law in 
America and came to Europe to lecture on them and to publish them in 
Netherlands, and more recently E. Langen (Germany) published a com­
prehensive monograph on Transnational Commercial Law.1
This writing has been brought about or, in the best sense of the word, 
rather provoked to a great extent by the ideas, new thougths, convincing 
and provoking arguments, confrontations of obsolate legal categories 
and the demands of recent developments in the field of international 
economic relations, which drive the wheels of this new conception. To 
meet the growing demands of the recent developments by more corres­
ponding legal science answers, of course, quite an impressing writing has 
developed.1'*4 But here, in this article, we shall focus on that stream, 
which is, as we may wit ness, sailing under the flag of „transnational 
law”, and which also invites, first, to combine this and other new con­
ceptions into a general picture and, second, to develop a comprehensive 
conception, a comparative law sythesis theory as it is called iu the sub­
title above.
As to transnational law, besides Ehrenzweig's „Specific Principles of 
Private Transnational Law” it is especially the comprehensive book of 
Langen by which the outspoken and thought-to-the-end features on the
one liant! and the newness on the other hand are brought home to us. 
“This book, as it is put in the first sentence of the work, is based on a 
new conception of international commercial law” (p. IX). In these new 
conceptions, theories or principles we face the terms private transnatio­
nal law or transnational commercial law; the present writing — when 
focusing on these problems — still carries the title: A Comparative Law 
Synthesis Theory v. Private Transnational Law as a New Conception in 
Private International Law under the assumption that the reason of this 
and also the juxtaposition of the terms “private transnational law”, 
“private international law” and “transnational commercial law” will 
become, hopefully, clear till the end of this article.
As will be seen this writing is of course somewhat more than a review 
on one or two books. The first part (II.  The Thesis: The New Conception 
Summarized) is meant to give a picture reliable as far a» possible of the 
new conception in question. The second part (III .  Antithesis: Transnatio­
nal Commercial Law — How Far is it New, why it is not a Law, and 
Other Counter- Arejumcnts ) brings some of the arguments the new concep­
tion, the fortress of this system should l>e fortified against, arguments 
by virtue of which, 1 think, the limits and perspectives of this conception 
become more decidedly discernible. In the third part (IV.  A Tentative 
Synthesis: a) Realistic Theories Combined to b) a Comparative Law Synthe­
sis Theory) a conception is ventured to combine transnational law and 
other related theories into a general law-making theory in the field of 
comparative law, especially comparative private international law.
2. Are 1 here new conceptions or theories still needed ? Are there peaks 
still to be climbed? Hilary when asked upon what moral considerations 
he put so much at stake to climb tire Mont Everest is said to have ans­
wered: “Because it was there”. Because it was there, unclimbed, we may 
add. This was my quest ion too when I ventured a kind of new theory on 
comparative private international law:2 were there peaks or hills still 
unclimbed in this field of law?s.
And now when the question is raised on what considerations a state 
is admitting the applicat ion of t he law of an other state within its territory 
by its courts, or how the solution of an international case should be mas­
tered (what, at the end, the main concern of the transnational concept 
really is) — again lots of theories offer themselves. Let us have just a 
short glimpse at them. One of these is that has been called neo-comity. 
This theory as at one time the statutists permit the foreign soverign (its 
legal system) to implement his own claims in the other country on comity- 
considerations of the latter. In an other formulation Saviyny called this 
a freundliche Znlassnnej (friendly admission). Even if it sounds differently, 
1 he same idea finds expression among modern authors, in lici/s “interna­
tional cooperation”, in Kahn- F rennet s “growth of internationalism", or 
in Schmitt hoff'и, opinion, according to which there are vested foreign 
rights, which deserve protection, or in another wording, namely in Szâszy's 
efforts to elevate coexistence to a principle of conflicts of law. Than there
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are the theories of tlie new “law merchant” (lex mercaloria), or the 
'‘Rahel’s Entscheidungseinllang (harmony of settlement) induced bv in­
tensive comparative law analyses to result in a gradual harmonization 
of decisions. When we turn to the American theories and conceptions, we 
find Currie’s “legitimate governmental interest”, the “principles of 
preference” of Carers, Lefler’s “choice-influencing considerations”, the 
Restatement Second with its “most significant relationships” etc. And 
these are not all of them in the “Heaven of Concepts”, im Begriffshimmel 
as Ilierinc/ called it, of the many concepts which weie aimed at the solu­
tion of the aforesaid question. But these theories and concepts have been 
under heavy criticism in the more recent time, especially if we take, e.<j. 
Ehrenzweig’s critical statements againts pure theoretizing. In tie Struggle 
with Reality in private Internationa/ Lauл a survey was “committed” as to 
what these theories and conceptions are able to offer and what they are 
unable to do once reduced to the level of realities. One of the negativ 
conclusion, e.g. was that these theories are open to so many constructions 
that they provide no assistance in the solution of concrete legal questions 
(especially as long as they are not settled by statute law), unless some sort 
of super or meta law is assumed which would in each case refer us to a 
specific foreign system, and, we may add. even then (if we are referred to a 
specific foreign system) there is no guarantee that this “nationalisation” 
of an international case is t he best solution. With other v orcis, any concept 
which fails to provide concrete rules for law-making or concrete decisions 
is a mere intellectual play in that mentioned “Heaven of Concepts”.
And now Langen’s book comes in with even a heavier criticism: 
“The years from 1820 to 1913 witnessed a thirtyfold growth in the volume 
of foreign trade”, and the expansion increased ever since in even more 
powerful pro port ions, “yet the legal scholars have paid little head to this 
phenomenon”, “to their minds” we can do with “rules of private inter­
national law which were propounded in the first I alf of the last century by 
the works of Joseph Story (1834) and Friedrich Karl eon Sarigny (184!>) 
and stand in direct line of descent fir m t he views of Nor th Italian, French 
and Netherlands jurists whose premises ar.d preoccupation were those of 
the fifteenth century — an age when America had yet to be discovered 
and r.o world trade as such existed . . .  All this is a museum” (p. 1.). To be 
sure, a well “dramatized” situation, which, if true, calls for urgent and 
major action. Now this has been met, a tacit assumption of the author of 
the book Transnational Commercial Law y a “work based on a new con­
ception if international commercial law” (p. IX.). How this conception 
qualifies of compared with other new conceptions, will be discussed in the
III. and IV. part infra; first let us see what this new conception really is; 
“refraining from theoretizing” on generalities, as the author’s repet eat edlv 
reinforced philosophy goes (pp. IX —X.), following him in his promised 
reliance on realities, cases and other facts to be honored. It is worth while.
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II. The thesis: the New Conception Summerized
3. The categories “thesis”, “antithesis”, and “synthesis” are of course 
borrowed from dialectics and in this legal application from a book’s 
organization just of this subject-matter,5 not so much in order to follow 
closely the laws of logics and philosophy of these categories, but rather to 
give a more decided apperance of the views expressed. Langen too, really, 
uses this method in developping his theory: first analysing why the so far 
developed theories and approaches failed to cope with the new conditions 
of international commerce, and then entering into a detailed presentation 
of the new conception.
4. One and the most general “reaction” or approach of law to any 
international case is what is called the classical doctrine, and what Langen 
— following his promised method to see what legal practice says rather 
than legal wrinting — demonstrates by the Serbian Loans judgement of t he 
Permanent Couit of International Justice: “The classical private internatio­
nal law of all countries proceeds on the assumption that any contract 
which is not a contract between States in their capacity as subjects of 
international law is based on the municipal law of some country” (p. 2).
Acordingly, the judge must link the contract to one municipal legal 
system. And this is where the classical doctrine fails, Langen’s critical 
review starts (p. 2 et segu.), because those principles or connecting factors 
by which classical doctrine links a contract to one or another municipal 
law, become more and more arguable and also because of their ambi­
guity, hardly correspond to the recent requirements. Against Savigny’s 
Silz des Rechtsverhältnisses the counter-argument was raised that a legal 
relation has no seat or that this does not say much to the judge. The 
“center of gravity of a contractual relationship” carries the same flaws, 
since the center of gravity may rotate from one part to the other of the 
whole, because “as in physics situations arise in law where there are two 
centers or one fluctuating center of gravity. . . thus this is not a doctrine 
that will provide an overall solut ion of the problem” (p. 5).
Little has been done for the international unification of the conflicts 
rules too, so it is the diverging variety of solutions the national conflict 
rules offer for the same international case. This gave rise to the problem 
of the aceptance of the other country’s conflict rules bv way of renvoi, or 
reciprocity and “neighbourly regard”, com Has gentium with other words, 
but with not very practical results. Comitas gentium creates namely “a 
situation comparable to that of two excessively courteous gentlemen who 
are unable to pass through a doorway beacuse each insits on yielding 
precedence to the other” (p. 6). The lex loci contractus, the law of the 
place of conclusion applicable to a contract has also given rise to doubt, 
and it was put aside by renowned courts of international commercial 
practice, “for in modern conditions of air travel the place of conclusion 
has become a purely fortuitous detail, open to easy manipulation” (p. 4). 
The one time unequivocal domination of the principle of domicile in 
these countries and that of nationality in others gave place to many
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exceptions on both sides, so ambiguity again when it comes to concrete 
decisions. The law of the place of performance (lex loci solutionis), backed 
specially by German practice, is not given a better grade either, because 
“each party has to honour his commitment in a different place, so that 
this criterion offers no solution, moreover, the identity of the place of 
performance is in itself a preliminary question, which can scarcely be 
sett 1^ 1 without deciding which law is applicable; hence, although there 
have been numerous judgements in favour of the place of performance 
and these represent an increasingly practice, this too offers anything but 
reliable or predictable solution” (p. 4 —б).
In the summing-up the judgement against the classical doctrine 
reads as follows: “In this quandry many courts have resorted to a veri­
table judgement of Solomon and split the contract in two”, although 
“this theory of ’bisection’ has been condemned“ (p. 5). This is one side of 
the coin. On the other wo are shown all the difficulties and disadvantages 
(following from the courts’ assumed obligation to resolve the particular 
cases on the line of the mentioned theories and connecting factors leading, 
at the end, to the application of this or the other municipal law), such 
the disproportionable length of time needed, the speculative ways to be 
resorted to, the strengthening of the “homing instinct” anyway inherent, 
and by all these the forcing of international cases into the Procustes bed 
of a single municipal system, the “nationalization” of the “international” 
(p. 203), although — as set forth in the central and leading idea of the 
book — "nationalism. . . one time a great force of life, spurring on the 
evolution of mankind, now it may become a dead weight upon the march 
of humanity” (p. VII).
б. The Law Merchant (lex mercaloria) doctrine is not much better 
off in the Langen-survey. Rules developped in international practice, 
i.e. non-domestic and non-international legislation products, did not 
find the simpathy of the supreme courts of. ex/., Germany, France, UK 
and the US as shown by decisions cited by Langen (pp. 8 — 10.). In the 
thirties, namely, the supreme courts of these countries are said to have 
supressed the trial courts’ “virtual revolt” against the exclusively muni­
cipal law doctrine following the model of the Serbian Loanos case. To 
mention, ex/, just one of the inferior courts’ dicision in this “revolt”, the 
Hansaetic court of appeal (Oberlandesgesicht) in Hamborg held that there 
was no reason to subject the case to one of the municipal laws in question, 
“because the case concerns a clause which has become firmly established 
over the years in international traffic” (p. 8).
But the Reichsgericht cracked down on this “interpretation refusing 
to consider the said internationally established clause except as a compo­
nent part of the German legal order (p. 9). This is said to be the attitude 
also of the more recent supreme court practice, and that could not be 
much changed by the pro-law-merchant scholarly efforts of the post 
World War II. period either. And Langen concludes: “Thus we have seen 
that the courts are solidly opposed to lex merecatoria" (p. 12).
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It is not a lex mercatoria question, but Langen very shortly delibara- 
tes on international legislation (unification) too, only to have its short­
comings emerged: the protracted procedure needed, the diverging inter­
pretation coming from the national legal background, the difficulty to 
bring the treaties into harmony with the underlying national legal sys­
tems, their limitedness to certain regions etc. (p. 22). And all this is of 
course not much overvalued in his preference for case-law, since^“the 
vigorous development of case-law can be expected to produce better 
effects more rapidly” (p. 22).
6. And then — after having presented the old solutions of the law’s 
reaction to the challenge of modern demands in international trade and 
after having seen also their failures, i.c. the critical assesment submitted 
by the book (with some simplification the thesis and the antithesis) — 
Langen proceeds to develop the synthesis, the modern way out: transnational 
commercial law. In this course we are shown the birth and notion of this 
phenomenon (infra 7). followed by a detailed analysis of the internal 
structure of transnational commercial law (infra S).
7. First he makes us see the birth-process of transnational com­
mercial law from the first stirrings to its developped notion. These “first 
stirrings” as he puts it, are said to be found in the courts’ practice. For 
this he identifies the Cassia case as far hack as 1908in which the Reichs­
gericht, although applying German law in the dispute of a German and 
English shipowner, first recognized the existence and pratieularity 
of the “international case” what really calls for more than the application 
of simply t lie one or the other domestic law; in its reasoning t he RG namely 
said that “an equitable balance should be struck. . . by making sure that 
the faculties and responsibilities attributed to one side are approximately 
matched on the other” (p. 14). Should namely in fact the law of either 
side carry more onus for the one party than the other, the acceptance of 
such a disproportionate solution can not be considered to have been 
assumed by the parties, unless there was a stipulation to this end; but 
if there was none the justifiable assumption can only be this mentioned 
“equitable balame”, i.e. a synthesis of the faculties and responsibilities 
of the two individual systems of law involved. “The idea of competing 
legal systems and the necessity of striking a just balance between them 
hangs in the air“ says Langen (p. 16.) and brings new evidence thereto. 
In a Swiss-German prescript ion case in 1922 the RG held that even if 
by ordre public the Swiss imprescriptbility rule was displaced and Ger­
man rule applied, even then the German court “was under obligation to 
ascertain which particular provision of the German law came closest to 
the way of thinking of the foreign law” (p. 16). What is hinted — more 
than hinted — here to is the common substance of the involved laws, 
what is to be looked for and this would be the transnational law solu­
tion.
The book then lists a series of decisions from various countries (US, 
France, UK, Czechoslovakia) ranging from 1937 to 1965 in which he 
sees this transnational law thinking materialized (p. 17). The Franco-
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German treaty and the articles of the Sarlor AG are also cited as more 
recent documents in which traces of the new thinking were visible. These 
documents provide namely that the applicable law, in addition to the 
founding documents (the treaty and the Charter of the Company), “shall 
include the common principles of German and French law, and that in the 
absence of such princ iples a decision should be taken in accordance with 
the spirit of cooperation which presided over the formation of the com­
pany” (j). 17). bleie we have, asthe argument of Langen goes, an although 
not consciously formulated but factually materialized transnational law 
philosophy.
Then he turns to the question who in the literature gave first ex­
pressed and conscious formulation of this thinking. It was Gutzwiller who 
is found to have written in 1931. when analyzing the activity of the 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunals set up after the W. W. I., that although these 
tribunds “had unfortunately not been so free. . . that they would have 
been allowed to slight ’international justice’ with its ingrained traditions 
and the claims of its temper and s j i i t . . .  , it is precisely among 
the States participating in the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals that, because 
of a common historical evolution, a series of such special transnational 
norms (my italics -  FM) has come into being” (pp. 17 - 18). After clearing 
the confusion of this term (as to its origin and its meaning some times not 
properly used) Langen developes the preposition that it was, especially 
after W. W. II.. comparative law that gave decided impetus to the trans­
national doctrine, namely by its intrinsic trend to find the common core 
of the various compared national laws or institutions, to concern prima­
rily on substantive law to construe uniform or harmonized Denkmodelle 
and to induce unified or harmonized law, i.c. unification as much as 
possible (pp. 20 — 23). Given this ideal function of comparative law and 
legal scholarship, its the more deplorable, as Langen says, that not much 
has been accomplished, little has been done to decrease the fragmentation 
of private international law (p. 23).
The most ambitious harmonization venture, the Hague Sales Rules had 
little success so far, and “the practical success of any further harmoniza­
tion depends on whether the Hague Sales Rules and t he Uniform Commer­
cial Code can be brought into line with each other. . . .  being the first 
(the Hague Convention of 1964) a code predominantly based on conti­
nental European thinking” (p. 23).
Turning to the American case-law practice, this does not come off 
much better either. As to the great reformers Currie, Carers and Ehrenz- 
weig the question is raised whether they were on the right path given the 
circumstance that case-law offers easy positions and invites almost by its 
nature to transnational law thinking. But Langen shares the misgivings 
of the Europeans, namely that not much new has come out from this 
source, at least not for the development of a transnational law philosophy.
The forum policy of Ehrenzweig is just mentioned with not much 
credit, especially if we read that “the idiosyncratic terminology of an 
Ehrenzweig, for example, multiplied the problems of the German scholars
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in coming to grips with developments in America” (p. 29). (In parenthesis: 
What Ehrenzweig. at least in my judgement, really has done in this line, 
is somewhat more, to which we shall come back later.) Cavers’s “result- 
selective approach” gets the most credit on the account that -  what the 
other Americans allegedly did not do or not enough intensively -  he 
“has taken steps to profit from advances in the field of comparative 
law”, or even more, he expressedly formulated or committed himself 
to the transnational law doctrine when he said: in his Contemporary 
Conflicts Law:
“The court’s principal objective is to reach a result that is compatible 
with the reasonable expectations of the parties, actual or fairly imputed; 
the purposes and policies of the States’ laws are, ex hypolhesi, subordinate 
to this end” (]). 30). But at the end, as far as the Americans are concerned, 
Langen “went ures to suggest that they would do well to adopt the auxi- 
liarv technique of comparative law ... so as to remove the burden of 
uncertainty still weighing upon recent endeavours, and thereby promote 
the universally desired unification of international law, more particularly 
in the field of commerce” (p. 30). By their inter-state law laboratory the 
Americans could especially contribute much to the desirable harmoniza­
tion of judicial decisions on international scope which, in theory, could 
easier emenate from a case-oriented and hopefully more comparative 
law influenced American practice than from statute-law countries. And 
for Langen "the harmonization of judicial decisions in cases of internatio­
nal scope brings us to the third stage of t he advance towards transnational 
Commercial law” (p. 30).
Comparative law, as can be seen, is a focal point in the development 
of transmitioned law solutions. On this understanding, and this is a very 
valuable thesis in Langen’s theory, comparative law is much more than 
a purely analytical or formal comparison of laws. He joins those who 
“handle national laws as the raw material from which, by a technique 
analogous to fusion, refining or destination, the shared quintessence of 
both municipal systems are extracted, and is recognized and applied as 
something common. Comparatived law has nowadays to be functional 
( p .  3 1 ) .
So this is the way we get to the thesis of transnational law (remar­
king, by the way, that “at the moment we must regard transnational 
law as little more than an inscription on a signpost”, or that “transnatio­
nal law denotes much rather a working method than a new legal order. . . 
it can be said here and now”, pp. 30, 32). Transnational law, by summari­
zing Langens findings with his words, is really the common substratum 
of the substantive law solutions of the domestic laws involved. "By trans­
national commercial law we mean, as he concludes, the aggregation of all 
those rules which held good in the same or very similar way for a given concrete 
legal situation in two or more spheres of national jurisdiction" (p. 33). This 
transnational law can apply by virtue of the parties stipulation or if it 
appears prima facie that transnational commercial law can apply . In 
these cases there are roughly three ways for the judical assasment. First:
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the two domestic laws are for that concrete legal situation substantially 
compatible, the judge applies his domestic law but referring to its com­
patibility in order that its judgement may carry due conviction. Second: 
In absence of compatibility ’’the judge must endeavour to pinpoint the 
difference ad to strike a balance. .. within the limits of non-mandatory7 
rules of both laws concerned”, such a decision too remains within the domain 
of the non-mandatory domestic rules. Thirdly: In the rare cases when 
these two solutions are precluded by ordre public or mandatory rules of t he 
legal systems concerned, the ’’judge is compelled to make a choice of 
national law and to proceed accordingly” (p. 23).
8. Langen, after having developped the notion of transnational com­
mercial law (really no theoretical delimitation is made in the book, unless 
we take the circumstance that his cases and legal institutions are taken 
mostly from the commercial practice although by their legal forms many7 
of the rules are private law rules too), he gives a detailed analysis on 
the structure of the transnational law rulings. This has been done after 
three chapters on specific subject-matters — licence agreements, sale 
of goods, limitation of claims — were also meant to demonstrate the 
transnational commercial law thesis of the book. In the last chapter the 
Practice of Transnational Adjudication ( “Binominal Adjuration“) a 
differentation or substantiation of the thesis of transnational commercial 
law follows. Here the internal structure of the notion is analysed, its 
application process developped and demonstrated.
a) Well, the aim of transnational commercial law is the binominal 
decision, a term the author henceforth uses for the desired decision 
competible with the national laws of both parties, referring also to the 
original or literal meaning of “binominal”, what is the derivation of 
the Greek “two-law” (bi-nomos) (p. 203).
But the binominal decision must find its way through the different 
language of the substantive laws concerned. The meaning of the term is 
often different in even the same language of more countries (e.g. Germany 
GDR, Austria, Switzerland). The author brings good examples. The 
difficulties e.g. of the translataion of the GATT texts, or the German 
Bundesgerichthofs decision from 195!) which warned a tribunal that 
apperent linguistic similarity was an insufficient ground for construing 
an Austrian statute by the light of German rules (p. 205). Accordingly, 
the court first has to clarify that in accordance or in spite of the actual 
words used which is really the same rule or the same legal institution 
holding the umbrella for the concrete international situation or case in 
question.
Very closely linked to the language probleme is the question of 
interpretation. The substantially identical rule, the said umbrella can be 
and often is interpreted in diverging directions. This is a well-known 
fact. And the divering directions are generally defined by the value 
systems (national legal systems, policies, international systems) in the 
background. According to Langen for the binominal decisions transnatio-
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nal interpretation principles are to be preferred. And the transnational 
interpretation principles, says Langen with the help of arbitral awards 
in this question and authors like Grotius, are “those methods . . . which 
are the same in all legal systems of the world” (p. 209). In a particular 
contract it is the complex of these generally accepted interpretation 
principles which should be given preference over other, eventually con­
tradicting national principles. As for example the Hague Sale Rides 
declare their own principles to be the guideline for purposes of interpreta­
tion and do not invite the forum’s interpretation rules.
b) The question next reaches already the central core of the trans­
national law: how to find out the substantial identity or similarity of the 
law or iules concerned. The answer: by comparison or through comparative 
law. This comparison has to be a thorough one and not just an adjunct 
to a conflicts law adjudication. By a thorough comparison and well 
closing conclusion the binominal decision is going to carry particular 
conviction. The book, in this connection, cites 30 decisions “founded on 
comparative law, ranging over the jurisprudence of all the major trading 
countries and international arbitral tribunals” (pp. 214 — 215).
But what if there is only a resemblance between the competing 
laws concerned. Or as /label put it in 1927 in his periodical: “At one point 
or another we come to an abyss which is spanned by no bridge” (p. 215.) 
The answer is twofold. First: The abyss has since that been bridged at 
many points, though certainly not everywhere (p. 21 ti). Second: “One 
of the two competing rules may be held up as a model to the other and 
will therefore deserve preference” (a sort of “better rule” as termed in the 
American practice) (p. 216).
But by what criteria is one rule “better” or more “modellike” than 
the other? The author’s answer: For this the court has to appeal to the 
judgement of a number of experienced and knoweledgeable persons, to the 
established legal orders carrying such a rule with the assumption that an 
established legal order “expresses the experience of many”, and to great 
conventions. A rule may also be examplary because it is “more well- 
tried”, more modern, not so obsolete. This may sound very arbitrary or 
subjective, Langen admits, but in the last resort it is the judge’s function 
to work out the best solution, as it has been in the ancient Rome when 
the judges’ oath said debel enini indicare secundum melius ei visum fuerit, 
and we may read the same very often today too when, e.g. “the solution 
which may lay claim to respect by virtue of its quality (my italics — F. AT.), 
and not only by virtue of its institutional authority” (p. 219).
<■ ) The striking of a balance between irreducible differences in national 
rules of law is evidently, by the logics of the things, the wav out if the 
differences are really irreducible. And to this end Langen offers the prin­
ciple e.r aeguo et bono (not “equity”!, what namely stays within t he borders 
of existing law, whereas a decision ex aequo el bono is not based on a settled 
positive law rule but rather on the justice-idea of the judge). This means 
that, in absence of a mandatory rule, the judge does not apply one or the
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other incompatible rule, but endeavors to reach a solution while having 
recourse to his justice-idea, i.e. deciding ex aequo el bono. Since there was 
no applicable law stipulated by the parties they wanted to carry the 
risks of the different laws commonly. Consequently the court “must 
ascertain the appropriate mid-term between two rules of law” (p. 223). 
Langen refers also to the N icomachean Lillies of Aristotle (V. 7) to strengt­
hen the conception of the judge as a mediator as part of our cultural 
heritage: “And the judge is sought as the man who stands in the middle, 
says Aristotle, and in many places he is called ’mediator’ in order to 
indicate the expectation that one will be justly dealt with if one receives 
the mean” (p. 224). And in international commercial cases this is, adds 
Langen, par excellence the case.
<1 ) Kx aequo et bono is but one principle to strike a balance between 
irreducible differences. Langen proceeds to present more. What we can 
see here is a comparative law survey on the transnationality of such prin­
ciples like the “principles of civilized nations” (with not much explanation 
who is civilized and who not), “pacta sunt servanda”, “good faith” etc. 
(pp. 225 — 228). Although it is stressed by the author, that these principles 
are to be derived inductively also “from the circumstances of the case and 
not just deductively placing summary reliance on an allegedly over-riding 
general principle” (]>. 220), one still can not avert the feeling that in the 
dilemma concerning the borderline between law and arbitrary judgement 
these general principles may and often do play into the hand of arbitrary 
tendencies.
Somewhat or much more concrete and reliable are those principles 
or rules for which Langen brought quite a number of cases to demonstrate 
that puncto the analysed particular countries these principles are equally 
shared. In the more limited field of commerce, they include the rule that 
fraud merits no protection, the principle that no-one may cause loss of or 
damage to another, whether intentionally or by negligence, without 
incurring an obligation to indemnify the damaged party, the prohibition 
of racial discrimination, the novation itself does not release the debtor 
from the original liability etc (p. 230 et secju.).
e) The last internal structural problem of the transnational law 
doctrine is the procedural dilemma, namely that the judges or courts 
(mra novit curia) are expected to be t horoughly familiar with a big number 
of national legal systems. The confort offered by Langen: There are the 
parties who are expected to “help” including also the exposition of foreign 
law. the courts have to focus on “individual” rules for determining trans­
national law not on the foreign law in its entirety and this makes the 
judge’s posili« n easier. This is really all before the last sentence of the 
book, where his answer to his critics concludes (a citation from •/. Esser): 
“That is the tribute of legal uncertainty which every jurisprudential 
innovation has to pay in its early days” (p. 245).
A C O M P A R A T IV E  L A W  S Y N T H E S IS  T H E O R Y  83
6*
III. Antithesis: Transnational Commercial Law — How 
Far Is it New, Why it Is Not a Law and other Counter-arguments
9. The new conception of transnational commercial law is presented 
by the author in a very intensive interaction with the various concepts and 
notions exsisting today in the field of private international law. This 
direct relation to everything timely and modern is an interaction also in 
tlie sense taht the readers, also as sharing or rejecting these various con­
cepts and notions prevailing in this discipline, feel adressed personally. 
More: one feels compelled to follow the author’s analyses and ideas, but 
also to contradict here and there, to confront his ideas with those of the 
author, to marge certain propositions to new ones. This thinking process 
is surely one of the most evident results of a good book. With some simpli­
fications: the more objectives and comments the better the book and vice 
versa. Here follow some objections and comments from one of the readers, 
starting from more general and also minor observations and then going to the 
heart of the matter”.
10. First some general and minor observations or objections the book’s 
theses could have been better protected against.
a) Let me start with a special and at t he same time general comment 
— originating from the circumstance that this writing comes from 
the socialist legal orbit.
It is, I feel justified to say, hardly imaginable that a book of this 
subject-matter if published by an author of this legal orbit would have 
been so void and „clean” of almost everything of the other side, i. e. the 
legal developments of the non-socialist world, as this book is void of the 
socialist side of international trade, “transnationality”, transnational 
commercial law, or whatever we call this whole context. One could say 
that a book should not be viewed from things not dealt wit h by the aut hor, 
but rather from things the author has written on. This is generally true. 
In this subject, however, the other side of the world is badly missed. Not 
only because especially in international trade the West is in daily contact 
with the East, and all or most of the legal problems the author discussed 
emerge — mulatis mutandis — in these relations too. Not only because 
the East -West scholarly dialogue has a substatial function in both practi­
cal and psychologic sense to build bridges, or, to use the favoured formu­
lation of t he Langen's theory, to “strike a balance” between East and West 
wherever it is possible, and here there were possibilities! But also be­
cause Langen's theory — and let me emphasise this circumstance: the 
very central element of his theory — faces, and should have faced the 
problem how to create or derive binominal rules for international cases 
with socialist and now-socialist parties when, as generally held, the laws 
and legal philosophy are the reflection and protective means of the un­
derlying economic and social structures, and these structures are in 
such a case „fairly” antagonistic, to say the least.So what ? No answer — 
at least from Langen’s book. (An answer is being ventured in the Synthesis 
of this article in part IV. infra).
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The only reference to socialist law Langen may claim says, at least 
to me, that he really bypassed the challange: to see how the socialist legal 
orbit really figures in the transnational law conception. This is reflected 
in his approach to the Hague Rules. The Hague Rules is a product of 
international law-making claiming universality and elaborated in long 
,,balance-striking” or harmonizing efforts both by capitalist and socialist 
countries. Its destiny as a workable set of laws is surely conditioned by t he 
strengtheing of this central element of its raison d’etre. To reduce then 
this problem to the relation of the American Uniform Commercial Code 
and the Hague Rules only (“the practical success of any further harmoni­
zation depends on whether the Hague Sales Rules and the UCC can be 
brought into line with each other” pp. 23, 73) is at least a onesided app­
roach, if not on unjustified simplification. Especially if we add the 
other argument (put forward by Mentschikoff and shared by Langen), 
namely that the chance to this ULIS-UCC harmony and consequently a 
viable future to the Hague Rules will be given only if the non-American 
countries develop to ‘ economies of overproduction rather than one of 
husbanded resources”, and that “the essential premise of its remedies is a 
free society” (p. 73).
This orientation, I am afraid, is leading nowhere. Sure — facts the 
arguments of Langen and others are based on show this — a worldwide 
harmonization is a difficult process, but not without hope and not 
without procedence. We may even say the world’s legal machinery could 
hardly do without the existing international treaties in the field of inter­
national private law. With other words — with more or less limits — they 
are viable. The ULIS as signed and entered into force is a substantial 
result in itself. With other pieces of international legislation they speak 
for the real chance, more, for the fact that in various particular fields 
common legal structures are possible and workable; this is especially the 
case when the major parties are ready to search for the most practical 
denominator for not unrealitic solutions. For it is surely unrealistic to tie 
any ULIS to the standards of an idelaized “economy of overproduction” 
which exsists nowhere but one country as we are shown in the outlined 
analyses. This is why such an orientation leads to nowhere, I mean.
International legislation is always a suit tailored for many and not 
for one user only, and consequently: with concessions and compromis to 
uneven economic standards (of production or “overproduction”) on the 
one hand and to different legal standards of the participating States on the 
other hand. This has been possible concerning many international con­
ventions (with the participition of States with different social and eco­
nomic structures) and did not yet fail concerning the Hague Rules either. 
E. g. socialist countries too participated in the codification, many signed 
the ULIS, the ratification is not a limine excluded by either socialist or 
non-socialist major countries, the UNCITRAL “ULIS-promoting” actions 
contribute a futher impetus to the process with at least a more harmonized 
legal thinking model if nothing else in international commercial law. 
Langen too admits that if for nothing else “the program already aehived
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is sufficient for the further elaboration of transnational principles to be 
left without qualm to the jurist and, more especially, the courts” (p. 74). 
But in this achievement the said international law-making attitude 
materialized with the varying influence of such laws as, e.g. the UCC, the 
Commercial Code of the Scandinavian Countries, the General Condition 
of Delivery of Goods of the C.MEA (which in turn as shown in their re­
forms of 1908 and 1975 have been influenced by the I'LIS) — and not 
only a onesided endeavour for a close ULIS-l'CC harmony.
It is therefore, to conclude accordingly, not necessarily “confusion” 
only if unification is developed with regard also to East-West, and it is 
hardly true that “the wholly different economic system of the socialist 
States must necessarily result “in basically different approach to the law 
of sale” (p. 73).
1'f this was the case the socialist countries would not have adhered 
to so many conventions in the field of international economic or commer­
cial relations, and the Hague Rules were not a legal product of East-West 
legal cooperation with values by Langen too admitted. If a “different 
approach” is needed than it is an approach to construe notions and theo­
ries reflecting and extending to the whole reality, to build bridges over 
abysses often more expanded by simplifying political language and psy­
chologic inertia than justified by real differences.
b ) And turning to the other side, I think it is not quite just to say that 
the Americans are lagging so much behind the others, supposedly behind 
the Europeans, in “adopting the auxiliary technique of the comparative 
law” as they seem to be graded in the book (p. 30, see supra 7). As could 
have seen (supra 7) especially Ehrenzweig is falling short in this judge­
ment. But to take just Ehrenzweig he is surely seriously and highly credited 
bv both American and international scholarship for its efforts to adopt 
the auxiliary technique of comparative law. Let me mention only his two 
big volumes of Private International Law undertitled and also in their 
substance comparative studiesG let alone his other works and activities 
in this field.7 Everybody knows what Rheinstein and Yntema has done in 
the field of comparative law. From the American “spring” of comparative 
law sprang up the American Journal of Comparative Law, and Michigan 
was the birth place of Raid's The Conflict of Law. Carers is properly 
credited by Langen too (supra 7). Or let me take another very concrete 
and very effective comparative law project — by the way somehow just 
in the line of “transnational lawmaking”: Schlesinger’s Cornell project 
on the Formation of contracts.8 This highly valuable work in both pragma­
tic and theoretical sense accomplished a worldwide (socialist States in­
cluded) analyses on the rules of the formation of contracts synthesizing 
1 he common core of the various national systems. No doubt this is an 
impressive comparative law product, not only pure theoretizing. Its 
common core theses as direct indications may serve international legis­
lation, the development of internal law-making, the law-making function 
of the judge when and where he is left alone in this position in a par­
ticular case, and they also serve as theoratical propositions, in the endre-
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suit for an optimum in the search of harmonized legal models in particular 
fields of law.
These are facts, others could be added from the court practice too.9 
And facts are hard things. Langen were surely the last to say with the 
German philosopher (when he saw t hat facts contradicted his philosophic 
statements) that um so schlimmer fur die Tatsachen (the worse for the 
facts).
c) Comparative law or comparison is as we could see, one of the 
main elements, the main process to get to the optimum transnational or 
binominal rule. The idea that via comparative laic we may develop better 
legal solutions than without the vistas provided thereby, that comparative 
law, comparative approach in general, may substatially contribute to create 
harmonizing solutions (to transnational rules if we use this language) is an 
age-old part of human lliinl ing. This could be, I think, the conclusion if ven­
tured of a comprehensive historical survey on the genesis of comparative 
law, of an Entstehung und Werdegang der Rechtsvergleichung as it could be 
titled with expressive Aussagekraft in German. In the light of this the 
statement that “the developments of the 45 years since 1025 are the 
approximate biithdate of comparative law” (p. 23) sounds at least doubt­
ful. That the last decades, especially those after the W. YV. II brought an 
unprecendented tide in comparative law efforts is unquestionable. The 
tide is unprecedented, but not the water.
May I refer to just some incidents of the supposed comparative law 
genesis. Langen as could be seen (supra 8c) cited Aristotle to strengthen 
his position concerning the judge as mediator. Let me cite from the same 
work of Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics he phrased the function of 
comparative law just as precisely and consciously as modern comparative 
law thinking to which it is so often, and seemingly mistakenly, connected. 
It is well-known, that he has analysed and compared more than hundred 
constitutions in order to make, as he says, the possibly best law.10 But let 
us make a shorter leap into history, to the last century only. In the middle 
of the last century — int the tide of social, economic and legal reforms, 
more revolution — eminent Hungarian lawyer-politicians (e.g. L. Szalay, 
./. Eötvös) made very thorough comparative analyses as part of their 
efforts to develop modern laws, to create comparative law vistas for a 
good private law codification.11 Other nations may display even more 
expressive or better known developments. May I refer to the well known 
French Société de la Legislation Comparée only, founded at the end of the 
last century (1869), and running its Revue Internationale de Droit Comparée 
with so much success ever since. The central idea (shown also on the cover 
of the Revue: lex multiplex — ins unum) of this Société was the legislation 
of laws in a most possible harmony with such laws of other countries, a 
comparative legi si at io n.
11. The next comments question the thesis and antithesis of Langen’s 
new conception, namely that the classical doctrines, the unification, lex 
mercatoria, and the other wavs, i.e. everything before transnational law 
was so ineffective or so failing that wit hout the needed coming of transna-
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tional law the whole structure was close to collapse, a verdict not ex- 
presselly formulated, but somehow tacitly suggested by the sequence of 
toughts and arguments of Langen's book. What лее are given to read 
(outlined supra 3—5) is first the classical doctrine with its shortcomings 
and failures demonstrated and with the suggestion that, accordingly, 
another solution was needed. Lex mercaloria seems to have been this 
solution, at least this follows from the circumstance that lex mercaloria is 
being treated by the book not only subsequent to the classical doctrine’s 
failure but also because this connotation is attached to it. But lex merca­
loria was not able to bring the salvation either. Accordingly, something 
else and new was needed again. And then comes unification, also with a 
very weak credit in Langen's sequence of thoughts. Of course, again 
something else and new was needed — and this was comparative law 
(or comparative law effects in private international law) with its birth- 
date expressedly postponed to the recent decades. But, in the book’s 
survey not much did come out of the comparative law approach as the 
most recent experiment either. So there was no way out: let transnational 
law come and save the situation.
I think that this train of thoughts and arguments may be justified 
logically, it makes the need of the transnational concept more apparent. 
But it is not justified at all, more it is misleading when coached as the 
historical side and facts of development, and this with two false tacit 
conclusions. The one being the impression as if the doctrines and ways in 
question would have followed each other in time. True, many examples 
and cases used in its arguments, by themselves, speak for a coincidence. 
But the author did not emphasise the fact that these ways and means 
were complementing each other and were and still are carrying jointly the 
whole legal structure of the international economic and personal relations. 
A junction rather than a disjunction is the appropriate reflection of the 
actual development. The appearence of the unification of substantive 
law — its growing importance — is not displacing the other ways sud­
denly and generally, they live in close symbiosis, even if substantive law 
unification is also a sign of the limited powersources conflicts law may 
provide. The other being the impression or the implied conclusion the 
reader is led to draw that the next doctrine or way is always displacing 
and replacing the former and so does the last one, i.e., transnational law 
too; transnational law becomes thereby the dominant way and general 
cure for everything or for almost everything.
12. The non-transnational conceptions in their ensemble and also in 
their particularity ere not as impotent, this is admitted by the author too. 
To use his example (p. 6.) those two excessively courteous gentlemen 
(“introduced” supra. 4) still passed somehow through the doorway, and 
many gentlemen were and are doing so ever since. Many — many interna­
tional cases passed through the doorways of conflicts law and still do so. 
The author himself says, e.g., with regard to the connecting principle 
lex loci solutionis, that “there have been numerous judgements in favour 
of the place of performance and these present an increasingly important
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practice” (p. 5). He also admits, that the lex mercatoria doctrine may claim 
a number of decisions in favour of its efficiency (p. 10) both in the practice 
of trial courts and the field of arbitral awards (p. 12). I  am not sure, to 
preceded with the comments in favour of the “old” doctrines’ ensemble, 
that e. cj., the principle of the place of conclusion was so generally and 
totally put aside as one might think by reading the Kegel’s report that 
this connecting principle was put aside bv the Swiss Federal Tribunal in 
1952 and the New York Court of Appeals in 1954 (p. 4). Alt hough the 
book, as promised, is relying on cases rather than on doctrine, but when 
the transnational law concept is developped (p. 13 et sequ.) we don’t 
see so convineigly more cases analysed in the pro-direction than such 
ones who speak for the viability of other doctrines like the Goldfields 
and Sapphire cases for example (p. 12). The forum law theory, or rather 
“the local law of the court.. . applied in all simplicity without much ado” 
counts for quite a frequency, as Langen recognizes, in the more recent 
times (p. 17). When, finally, to the already mentioned importance of sub­
stantive law unification (supra, 10/a) we add the fact that the national 
codification of conflicts law is showing an upward trend12 then the “old” 
machinery seems to keep potent function in the legal channeling of inter­
national trade and other private law relations.
13. And now coming close to the heart of the matter, to the core of the 
conception of transnational commercial law one of the comment one may 
rise is, that there is no definition or delimitation or description of what 
“commercial law” really is in this transnational law. Is it a branch of law . 
(a Rechtszweig) as continental jurists would call a system of rules belon­
ging under .specific criteria to one branch characterized by these criteria ? 
Or is it more a loose set of laws and rules operating in the field of interna­
tional trade? What belongs then to this category? Conventions and 
treaties of substantive law nature ? If yes to which extent ? What about 
the international rules or the laws emanating from the economic integra­
tions as concerning the corporations or antitrust law for example ? Or is 
it the conflicts-ridden sphere of international trade only ? Although one 
must admit that even continental lawyers are not totally “complete” in 
the systematizing of the various branches and systems of law, and this 
applies to international commercial law too, still there are some orienta­
tion strongholds and when a new conception of international commercial 
law is launched, more clearness should be able to be expected.
When we look at the implied delimitation-conclusions of Langen, 
than his transnational commercial law is really the sphere of conflicts 
law, i.e. conflict situations of two or more national laws which are suitable 
to the coming into operation of a transnational solution, a binominal 
ruling, situations where the “striking of a balance” is per definitivnem 
possible at all. This follows clearly from the transnational conception 
if we remain within the limits of its conception-constructing lines as descri­
bed above (supra, II). The circumstance that Langen relies at many places 
on conventions or municipal substantive laws (ULIS, US Uniform Com­
mercial Code, BGG etc) does not make much difference when the borders
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of principle of his conception are considered. Norms already settlecJ either 
by international or national legislation may serve at most as reference 
sources and partial components of the binominal rules the judges are 
developing and applying in order to resolve concrete conflicts-situations 
instead of having recourse to classical doctrine solutions to this end. And 
the commercial in this — thusly limited — transnational commercial 
law is really that part of institutions of traditional private international 
law in wich predominantly merchants are channelling their transactions, 
although the same institutions can be and are used by nonmerchants 
too (e (j. sale contract as the most evident of such instituions). With other 
words the commercial is the prime facie or traditionally commercial 
character of a given deal or concrete conflict situation to the solution 
of which this or the other conception may be offered and to which the 
transnational conception offers of course its transnational rule it would 
search for in the described way [supra, II.).
14. The next comment concerning the hard core of Langen я transna­
tional law touches upon the legal character of transnational commercial 
law: is il a law or a method only? The book is not sufficiently unequivocal 
in this point. On three places we find allusions that it is a method or 
methodology only. So for example in the Foreword we read: “The aim of 
this book is to stimulate the use of a new method" (p. IX). Then he rises 
the question (without analysing it unfortunately) whether this “methodo­
logy” could apply to East-West relations (p. 1). An in another four lines 
really hidden in an analysis of another problem, we are plainly said, that 
“it must be made clear from the start that transnational commercial law 
denotes much rather a working-method than a new legal order” (p. 32). 
But these statements disappear somehow in the whole work (they count 
4 — 6 lines altogether on the mentioned three different places), although 
this is a vital side of the whole conception if we want to know what it 
really is, therefore this methodology character should have been more 
explieitv elaborated. In fact it is not. Probably not by chance.
On the whole, namely, the image is projected as if transnational 
cimmercial law were a law. In the lastly cited statement itself, otherwise 
meant to be most foundamental, this transpires trough the words “much 
rather. . . .than”, a formulation admitting the other (“legal order”) side 
already by this very grammatical or logical structure, this being more a 
junction than a disjunction. But the projected law-image emanetes also 
from the circumstance that transnational law is uxtaposed to the classical 
private international law, more it is said to be a better legal solution than 
the classical doctrine and offers more efficient future than protracted in­
ternational legislation, with other words: transnational commercial law is 
elevated to the level of real laws, legal orders, aggregation of rules 
which have their binding force in their constitutional law structure, na­
mely that they have been passed by lawmaking bodies as defined and 
admitted by the constitutions of the countries involved. The law-image 
is quite clear when it comes down to the theoretical summarization of 
the new conception. And here, as already detailed above (supra, 7) Langen
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concludes, that “to summarize, by transnational commercial law we mean 
the aggregation of all those rules’’ (p. 33, my italics, FM). This is now 
a clear and frank proposition. And by “all those rules” really all those 
rules are understood which in the broad field of the aforesaid prima facie 
commercial law (supra, 13) may play a part in the “transnational ad­
judication”. And these are an undifinible aggregation of rules existing in 
numicipal laws, international treaties, judgemade rules, and the combina­
tions of all these, or nonexisting rules called into existence by the court in 
the transnational law-making process as described by Langen (supra, 8). 
In the transnational adjudication process this whole aggregation of rules 
of varying origin is not only elevated to the level of the positive laws, but 
by this elevation the various rules (if not newly developed in the concrete 
situât ion) are also alienated, cut off from t heir c onerete source of law, t hey 
become freely handled pieces in the transnational adjudication activity 
of the judge, and accordingly, their binding force (their norma potentiae) 
emanates from their metajuristic convincing power, or lastly from the 
circumstance that a variation of their possible combinations is formula­
ted and applied by the judge as ratio decidendi in a given concrete case.
But these are not characteristics of law as the body of binding rules. 
As it is generally accepted any rule claiming to be a legal rule has to be 
formally and identifyably phrazed as such and has to be “filled” with State 
power or authority of a concrete State or an ensemble of States, i. e. 
it has to be made bv public organs authorized thereto and published as 
source of law adressing thereby accessible orders to the possible parties 
and the law-enforcing organs, the courts. To t he extent courts are authori­
zed to make law (besides enforcing the legal orders of the legislator), the 
same applies to their inter omnes rules mulatis mutandis of course. Cus­
tomary rules or judge-made rules of foreign or international origin can be 
considered as law only because these rules are christalized and more or 
less firmly established rules suitable also in their identifyable form to be 
followed, and accepted and sanctioned as legal rules by municipal trialcourts 
of a given State or by international fora the awards of which are en­
forced by the relevant States. And there is no other law. Lex mercatoria 
if  considered as a set of rules beyond international and national legisla­
tion is, at the end, also a customary law effective only there and to the 
extent where it is backed by the State aithority, the authority and the 
faculty to operate by force if necessary of such rules must go back, no 
matter how thin the thread is, to a so-called Kelsenian Grundnorm, other­
wise it is not a law. The same applies, again mulatis mutandis, to any solu­
tion, indication or “rule” offered by a comparative analysis, or by com­
parative law generally; such rules can be applied as legal rules only either 
because they are legislated or judgemade rules of a concrete State and 
therefore correspondingly applied by this State or they are the product 
of international and foreign legislation, international and foreign cus­
tomary law but accepted and their application ordered by t he State. There 
is no comparative lav- rule or legal order in the legal sense of the word. 
Comparative “law”, rather comparison can only syntesize the various
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involved regulations and offer its syntheses as indications to the law­
maker (legislator or judge).
In the same sense transnational law is not a system of legal rules, 
and therefore not an “aggregation of all those rules”, not a law in the legal 
meaning of the terms. If all the transnational or binominal rules Langen 
has synthetized and the others which could he synthetized in the broad 
framework of transnational commercial law were a real law and an aggre­
gation of laws then they would live and float somewhere above the “nor­
mal” or “terrestrial” rules and legal systems, described and defined from 
time to time by someone (by whom and by what kind of authorisation ?) 
and the States or courts were only expected to stretch up their hands and 
pick out the rule most suitable to their case. This picture is not much 
changed if we say that it is the State or courts who are supposed to define 
the whole aggregation or only a particularly needed rule of transnational 
law. In this case too t he corpus of national rules would depend on the actual 
“mind” of the actual State or court who says this or that rules to be the 
transnational law. Transnational law, thusly, is a varying corpus of 
rules depending on the “being” (legal scholar, judge, legal counsel) who 
is just vizualizing or synthetizing this meta-world of norms. These norms 
are said to carry their norma pofentiae in their convincing character, in 
their being better tried, in their “virtue of quality” in their model-faculty, 
in their wide acceptance by “experienced and knowledgeable persons”, 
in the arbitrariness-ridden ex aequo et bono justisness-feelings of a supposed 
ideal legal mind (pp. 216, 219, 222) etc. — again meta-juristic factors. 
But how fragile and how arbitrary consequences these thusly “justified” 
— to private law “justified” — transnational rules may have, let me, 
e.q., mention that “the prohibition of expropriation without compen­
sation” is also listed, although with not explicit reservation in a footnote, 
among such rules or general principles (p. 130).13
It would be another story, of course, if the court would pick out a 
rule from the aggregation of such transnational norms because it is 
ordered to do so being that rule part of an international or foreign regula­
tion due to apply by virtue of the courts’ conflicts law order or because 
the state is adhereing the international regulation (a convention, e.g., 
in question). But Langen’s conception goes, as could have been seen, 
farther. It extends also to rules which are otherwise a good and rational 
mixtum compositum of all possible regulations involved but without 
“legalized” ties to the forum’s constitutional source-of-law rules (see the 
binominal rules proposed to strike a balance between irreducible diffe­
rences in national laws, supra, 8c).
Again it would be another story if we were to say that this picking 
out of a rule from the transnational “tenders” operates within the court’s 
competency to settle the case. With other words if the judge were left 
alone by legislative or binding customary rules — then it is his legitimate 
privilege and duty to make that norm (and to take it from a transnational 
law analysis if he thinks so) on which his judgement can be reasonably 
built, which may serve as a reasonable ratio decidendi. But as could be
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witnessed, Langen’s conception goes for beyond this. If  the so developed 
ratio decidendi is continuously adopted and applied by other courts too, 
then it becomes, with regard to that particular state, a binding precedent 
or customary rule, and again not, in the described legal meaning a trans­
national rule.
15.1. This lastly mentioned situation when the court is free and forc­
ed to create an individual ratio decidendi because there is no preexisting 
“settled rule”14 — as the forumapproach reasoning of Ehrenzweig goes — 
which would be binding and give in thesi prefabricated solution into the 
hands of the judge, this is the situation where as a residuary rule the 
Ehrenzweigian forum policy comes in. Because for the judge, whatever 
the preferred and applied solution-rule can be qualified to either in the 
adjudication procedure or ex post facto to a foreign rule through this or the 
other conflicts law lex, or to something else, perhaps to the lex fori or to 
a new rule, for the judge it is the forum policy: the valuejudgements and 
philosophy prevailing in the forum-country and shared by the judge 
which formulated and define the substantive law solution. Because the 
judge does not and can not act in a value- and-policyless vacuum, as a 
rule he can not dissociate himself from the values and policy his court is 
ordered the maintain, he also can not perform the Mülhausen spectacle 
to lift himself up and out of his situation, he is part of the forum policy 
structure and in the particular situation described he applies forum 
policy.15
From the lex-fori conception — really an approach rather than a 
theory10 — Ehrenzweig made a substantial step farther: lie developped 
the theory of private transnational law in his Hague Lectures published 
in 1968.17 This excursion or terminus to Ehrcnzweig was undertaken for 
the last critical comment concerning the new conception of Langen’s 
book: how far namely is this conception new? Before answering this ques­
tion let us briefly summarize Ehrenzweig’s private transnational law.18
a) The field of operation of this private transnational kaw is really 
the same as the transnational commercial law of Langen: the institutions 
of conflicts law or their background substantive law institutions which 
are, depending on the nature of the actually chanelled deal, used both 
by merchants and non-merchants; with one addition however, i.e. that 
Ehrenzweig deals with per definitionem non-commercial law institutions 
too, for example with family law questions. But in this connection this is 
not decisive, because by classical private international law such prob­
lems as family law, persons, property, labour law, companies, obliga­
tions, procedure etc., well a broad spectrum of parts or branches of 
both private and commercial law have been covered for ages. The same 
scope is meant by Ehrenzweig for private transnational law.
b) Transnational law according to Ehrenzweig is made up by those 
mostly substantive law norms (growing in number), rather specific than 
general principles, which are in their substance common in the various
omestic legal systems.
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г) It comes to t he application of such norms or principles because:
1. the sunstantive rule of the forum is not spatially applicable,
2. the application of a foreign rule is not required by either a “super­
law” (a treaty, e.y.) or a settled rule of choice.
3. in this case the choice must he based on the interpretation of that 
substantive rule of the forum which either party, or the court in the 
public interest ex officio, seeks to displace,
4. and this interpretation may lead to the application of a foreign 
rule while the substantive rule of the forum applies as “residuary” only.
d) Why rather specific than general principles? Because such gene­
ral principles as, e.y., the personal status, the lex personae have so many 
incidents and these are resolved under their specific relations that the 
general status afterwards is hardly more than an empty generalization, 
although useful for jurisprudence. Besides or against the lex personae 
other rules may govern the contract of the spouses, the family torts, 
the widows position etc. Or within the tort liability institution specific 
rules may apply to the guest (the so called guest statute) and others may 
be required to apply to the admonitory sanctions.
e) The theory of private t iansnational law. as.Ehrenzweig emphasi­
zes, “can be required us an independent legal deseipline [let alone a 
branc h of law — my insertion, F. M.] only in the same manner as legal 
sociology, legal philosophy, legal psychology, or comparative law. Being, 
allpei vading, these “subjects” are not branches of the law like contract 
or bankruptcy, but methods in each such branch.”19
15.2. If we now think to summarize the newness of Langen’s trans­
national conception than we may conclude to the following statements:
a) Transnational law is surely a new fenomenon of our decades. 
But Lainytn does not pretend that he has the priority or exclusive merits 
in developing this new conception, he has not, by his book, filed a patent 
law novelty suit as to the exclusive right to this conception.
b) He “only” says, and this with right, that his book is based on this 
new conception. To this end he has searched for the first stirrings of 
transnational thinking in the court practice and legal writing. And than, 
with many facts at hand, he developped a theoretically postulated notion 
of this partly witnessed and explored, partly created conception comple­
ted by an analysis of the internal structure and developing process of 
transnational rules.
r) In this effort he missed to consider the private transnational law 
conception of Ehrenzweig, although it is not quite the same as his. Their 
books have identical values in at least two perspectives. On the one hand 
they are the first elaborated postulation of this conception since everyt­
hing before was more sporadic or isolated and not sufficiently and not 
systematically developped. On the other hand both of these books go into 
details and elaborate a series of transnational rules or chances for trans­
national solutions concerning a substantial number of legal institutions.
The Ehrenztveiyian private transnational law is, however, more 
limited than that of Langen, and in this extent not the same, again in a
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least two perspectives (and in this regard the newness of Langen’s con­
ception is surely original). On the one hand (besides analysing more cases) 
his conception is completed by a very valuable and detailed processing 
theory, by comprehensive propositions concerning the developing pro­
cess of transnational rules. On the other hand the conception of Langen 
goes much farther in the scope of transnational law: for Ehrenzweig its 
existence is limited to the above mentioned rarrow compass and is meant 
to function as a method only (supra, 15.1.), for Langen it has the described 
more general prevalence (supra. 11.) and pretends to be more a law 
(an “aggregation of all those (relevant) rules”) than a method only 
(supra, 14.), a circumstance that was questioned above.
IV. A Tentative Synthesis: a) Realistic Theories Combined
16. The transnational law conceptions of both Ehrenzweig and Lan­
gen, even in spite of the critical objections and comments “invited” by 
themselves, aie to a high drgne realilic theories or conceptions ( ontriluiting 
very substantial elements to the whole legal machinery of the internatio­
nal economic and personal relations. This of their values, especially their 
pragmatic orientation and efficiency referred to becomes even more 
evident when we look at them from the vista of a more general survey 
of comparative law thinking. I say from the vista of comparative law 
thinking because this seems to be justified by at least three considerations. 
First because these conceptions arose and developped in the main stream 
of contemporary comparative law thinking. Second because they reach 
their transnational rules i. e. t he essence or hard care of their own identity 
and newness via intensive comparative analysis. Third because they 
already contributed to the development of a more efficient and more 
concrete comparative law “theoretiring”.
a) Let ns start this valuation within the framework of a more general 
survey of comparative law by Rubel's universalism which was by far more 
realistic than the ideas behind the legislation comparée, (suppra, lo/c) so 
much maltreated by nationalism and two world-wars. Everybody, or 
almost everybody, who so far has approached the disepline of private 
international law and comparative law with a creative mind, inevitably 
goes back to Rubel. Ever since he complied his The Conflict of Laws in 
four valûmes, he has become the Omega to whom even those return, who 
have have not made him their starting point. His work has somehow 
become the landmark of modern comparative law and private interna­
tional law. History has made it so. Amidst the turmoil of a world war, 
when the mutual respect and the recognization of the values of 
nations was anything but reality, Rahel began to write his oeuvre sine 
ira et studio and has done many other things for a < ooperative comparative 
law spirit. The realistic and historically very desired elementsof his com­
parative law conception were many. The major ones:
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1. The reiteration of tbe faith and necessity to appreciate the others 
too. This man of learning, who fled Hitlerite fascism, amidst the disillu- 
sonment, ire and exasperation of the war, did not only give expression to 
“the deplorable state” of his discipline,. . . "to a change of which mutual 
understanding and toleration were as wanting as in international policy”.20 
He reiterated his his faith for the epoch following upon the war in his 
comparative Conflict of Laws as follows: “What this book is intended to 
suggest is a patient and concerted world-wide discussion determined to 
relieve the present chaos. .. . The legal profession has great power and 
deserves great confidence”.21
2. To hild up, wherever possible, harmonized legal thinking models 
was another major effort of his conception. He pleaded for the integra­
tion of the legal and scientific values, of ail countries and has become the 
most prominent designer of the circuit whence institutes and periodicals 
of comparative law were to spring forth.22
3. His conception pleaded also for a quite pragmatic integration, 
namely the international legislation or unification of subject-matters 
especially inviting t hereto. In his work Dus liecht des кerhaufes he showed 
how through international agreements and other legal instruments imple­
mented in practice, a new lex mereatoria, independent of domestic and 
conflicts laws could be established as a fact22 to which comparative law 
may contribute so much. Although he also emphasized, especially as far 
as the gradual harmonization of decisions ( Entscheidungseinklavg) is 
concerned, that we should not rely on ideas (e.g. this harmony of settle­
ment) too remote from reality.24
b) It is only to be regretted that within a few years after War the 
earlier expectations of an Augustan Peace, owing to the cold war, dwind­
led to more hope. Instead of mutual understanding heavy, not always 
scientific, criticism or discrimination prevailed in East and West against 
the other. Comparative law in the socialist legal orbit was disclaimed any 
need and justification or simply ignored this time.
Still it was comparative law and it were the comparatises of the legal 
profession who, working into the hand of an approaching better climate 
of international politics too, still and soon started a dialogue if even with 
a lesser or more pragmatic- faith than anticipated for an after-war Augus­
tan Peace. This comparative law has been marked by confidence subject 
to proof: the more through comparison the more justified confidence in 
realistic ends. The names are known, all scholars of this time now (Jl. 
David, A. Ehrenzweig, К. Zweigert, M. Angel, (Ig. E ör si, I- Szabo, T. 
T. Blagojeric, V. Knapp to mention just a few from both sides). The “rea­
listic ends” range from the mutual cognition to cooperation and com­
mon laws. Analyses of the other legal orbit with ends other than the 
assumption of or the speculation on the rapid historical disappearence of 
the other side become more and more predominant. Conceptions got 
reinforced that the comparatist is more of an architect than a photo­
grapher, and this also with regard to East-West comparative law activity. 
Socialist law became part of the general comparative law sphere also in
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the West, and vice-versa. Although many think that comparative law is 
only a method (how to effectuate a comparative research activity) and 
not a discipline of its own, the tendency is the growing belief and fact, 
also on the socialist side, that comparative law is though not on order of 
a branch of law but a discipline of legal science with the possibility of 
developing theoretical comparative law statements or theses as element 
of comparative law conceptions or theories concerning well-difined ques­
tions or legal institutions, and this also with regard to East-West again.
The East- West Comparative Law Conference of Budapest 1969 can be 
mentioned as one major station in this respect.25 The working idea of the 
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law with socialist participa­
tion is a major outcome of this tendency with global importance.
Comparative law in this realistic conception may serve (beyond 
the ends it is capable to serve within this or the other legal orbit) the cog­
nition of other legal systems and laws, a better fundation of legal theories 
or legal philosophy, the dialogue in the spirit of détente or peaceful coexis­
tence, the criticism of or struggle against retrograde or otherwise hostile 
opinions, the unification or international legislation, the elaboration of 
harmonizing legal thinking models with regard to particular legal institu­
tions, the adjudication activity of the judge — and all the ends fostered 
by these phenomena (cooporetion, understanding, legal education, prac­
tice, legal science etc.).
c) But as can be seen, besides the more general ends substantial 
emphasis rests in legislation, thinking models, indications to be used 
by the judge in particular or welldefined questions and legal institutions. 
Instead of very general theorizing, which both Ehrenzweig and Langen are 
opposed to, more concrete theorizing: elaborate rules or principles for the 
growing practical demands concerning well-defined concrete institutions. 
This is what the transnational law conception comes in with: concrete 
rules and principles for concrete fact situations (legal institutions) with 
a defined processing method to develop such rules and principles (the 
question of how much their transnational law is a law has been discussed 
already and in the course of this the range or scope of their conception 
became evident too (suppra, 14—15).
Their conceptions are realistic and highly valuable at least for the 
following reasons.
1. By their transnational law propositions they correspond to very 
important needs of reality, i.e. to the developing of rules needed in the 
practice of international trade and personal relations.
2. They are meant to act more in the field of concrete institutions 
where a commity of rules (transnational rules in their language) is viable.
3. Ehrenzweig through that “narrow compass” where there is no sett­
led rule in private international law and where therefore, through inter­
pretation of the forum rule otherwise non-applicable, the judge has to 
resort to the residuary solution to develop a transnational rule via com­
parative law analysis.
7 ANNALES — Sectio Iuiidica — Tomus XVIII.
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4. Langen is offering t he same for this compass — but goes also beyond 
this framework: no matter whether the fact situation is covered by a 
settled rule a transnational or binominal rule is said to be developed and 
justified in conflicts situations, i.e. generally with regard to any inter­
national case (this later element being questioned above, 14— 15).
5. By all these functions transnational law contributed much also to 
the realisation of those more general but also realitic conceptions and 
ends of comparative law which are discussed above (16a —b).
17. I f  we combine elements of these conceptions, theories or approaches 
of comparative law we may proceed among others to two major conclu­
sions.
a) The framework and substance-elements comparative law as a 
legal discipline can be seen, theoretically justified and developed. In 
socialist legal writing this “can be. . . ” has been transformed recently, as 
far as comparative law as a general discipline is concerned, to an “is . . . ” 
(namely theoretically justified, developed etc.) by the new book of 1. 
Szabo “The Socialist Theory of Legal Comparison”.26
b) In defined subject-matters and with regard to certain legal 
institutions comparative law syntheses are justified and needed, and this 
also with regard to East-West. Let us limite the validity of this statment, at 
least for this article, to commercial and private international law as the 
major home of comparative law syntheses. The development of such 
syntheses demands of course a through analysis of the regulation of the 
socialist and non-socialist legal systems involved, the thorough analysis 
of the underlying social and economic factors of the particular regulation 
in question, the facts and considerations justifying harmonizing rules with 
East-West validity — a requirement not met by the analysed transnatio­
nal law conceptions.27 Into these comparative law syntheses transnational 
rules and the adjudication process as developed by Langen can be combi­
ned. These comparative law syntheses are namely an optimum of theoreti­
cally justified solutions for particular fact-situations or legal institutions. 
They are indications suggested (bv anybody undertaking a research- 
project of this nature) to lawmaking bodies and legal thinking generally. 
To lawmaking bodies — legislators and judges if the later are meant 
also to make law in the situation in question — that they may adopt 
these indications and transform them to real legal rules by providing 1 hem 
with the State authority legal rules are conditioned of. These indications, 
the transnational rules if we like it, are not elevated ab ovo to positive 
law anticipating and accepting thereby a meta-law of metajuristie struc­
tures as figuring in the transnational conception. They remain what they 
aie: indications, models of suggested real rules. They evolve into real 
rules if so ordered by law-making bodies authorized thereto. And then: 
these indications, accepted or not by law-making bodies, serve also as 
devices or cristalized theoretical statements in the international and 
domestic discussion of legal science contributing to a more harmonized 
legal thinking when the regulation-element of certain questions or legal 
institutions are visualized and projected. One of the outcomes of the
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comparative law synthesis-making is its influence on the contract-practice 
induced thereby to a harmonizing regulation of the contractual relations.
18. Accordingly, the second major conclusion when the mentioned 
conceptions are combined is the perspective of comparative law syntheses 
or, as I  would prefer to say, of a comparative law synthesis theory as a 
possible set of justified comparative law syntheses.
Langen in strengthening his theoretical positions, that e.ej. “certain 
conclusions have become essential instruments of progress all along the 
line”, cites Einstein and Heisenberg who state: “what is possible, what is 
to be expected, is an important constituent of our reality, and one which 
may not simply be forgotten alongside given facts” (p. X. —XI).28 May I 
too quote Heisenberg — partly to strengthen Langen’s conception also as a 
theoretical category. Also because he often claims to dissociate himself 
from “theorizing”, one could almost say from theories in generally. With 
all credit to its expressed decision to go into the forest of practice, because 
that is what counts, that is reality and law and this is what he would like 
to be concerned with. But not all theory comes from the devil on the one 
hand, and he too submerges into deep waters, as could have writnessed, of 
theoretical discussions on the other hand. And real theories must emanete 
from reality, from experiments and facts and must also be related to them. 
By Heisenberg the following is held of the birth of a theory: “The deve­
lopment of science is frequently seen as a sequence of events of the follo­
wing kind: First new phenomena are being observed, they are studied 
systematically, and after a sufficient amount of experimental material 
has been collected, the results suggest the concepts, by which the ma­
terial can be interpreted. Finally, by collecting new data and by refining 
the concepts a theory can be developed.”20
I think this is exactly where we are with the comparative law con­
cepts, and also with the transnational law conception. The major virtue of 
all these are the facts and phenomena being observed, namely that inter­
national cases need better solution than often offered by the procustes 
bed of the conflicts-rule-ordered national law, that international legisla­
tion is a slow process, lex mercatoria is not a general salvation either, and 
that so practice resorted more and more to the “striking of a balance”, 
i.e. to a justifiable optimum rule (a transnational or binominal rule in the 
transnational law language). The next step is the concept: with the trans­
nationalists the postulation of the general justification of binominal 
rules, with the comparative law conception as here understood the postu­
lation of the general justification of comparative law syntheses as indi­
cations to the law-makers and legal thinking as described. In these connec­
tions both the comparative law and transnational law conceptions are 
theoretical conceptions.
To proced a step forward, I think that “the sequence, of tho events” 
may have gone so far as to require the development of a comparative law 
synthesis theory.
This is being ventured below claiming also East-West relevance, and 
this from socialist point of view. As will be seen elements of the transnatic-
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nal conception, especially its often mentioned processing method, are at 
several places built into this theory -  ex post facto I must say, since this 
theory is now only a somewhat brushed up English version ot its original 
Hungarian from 1969.30
IV. A Tentative Synthesis: b) a Comparative Law Synthesis Theory
19. First a general thesis which is surely undisputed — indeed indis­
putable. Namely: any theory of legal science has to be related ultimately, 
at least as one of his major if not most decisive relevances, to positive law. 
The sui generis characterics or criteria of a legal science theory are, that its 
subject-matter consists of legal phenomena and that is is directed — by un­
folding laws a d tendencies in the development of law -  to mak ing, improve­
ment, change and unmaking of law. The same must hold good for a theory 
of comparative private international law, if there be such a thing, since 
it is comparative private international law for which a theory is ventured 
here. Accordingly, when legal writing, an author deals with the “how” 
of the comparative law activity, i.e. when it explains how an aut hor should 
write about several legal systems, how a lecturer should lecture about 
the same: this may be a very important activity of the theory of juris­
prudence (in the present case: the methodology of comparative law rese­
arch and writing) nevertheless it is not a legal theory, strictly speaking. 
From the aspect of theory of science ('ll issenschaftstheorie) the term “legal 
theory” will be deserved by such a theory only for which the ultimate 
subject and object is law, and not the skill of how a comparative law or 
any legal study has to be written. This has to hold good also in the light 
of t he requirement, or even more thereby, that law must be seen simulta- 
nously in its social context. This is held also by the rationally thinking 
modern legal philosophy. The excellent work of V. Peschka on modern 
legal philosophy absolves me from a detailed theoretical documentation 
thereto. Peschka starts with Kelsen who, in his “General Theory of Law 
and .State” explains that “the subject-matter of the general theory 
of law is the legal norms”;31 Peschka continues with Hegel and the 
Philosophische Hefte professing that cognition (“theoretical” cognition) and 
“volition” (i.e. the “practical activity”) -  these two form the essence 
of t heory;32 and lastly he draws t he conclusion: “The relation of conscious­
ness to existence covers both the theoretical, intellectual and the practical, 
volitional processes, namely in such a way, that within the dialectical 
unity the decisive feature is the practical relations of the consciousness to 
existence, in which the cognition is just one indispensable, essential moment. 33 
The highest form of abstract legal conscuoisness is the legal theory which, 
according to the aforesaid, cannot function in a correct manner unless 
t unites the moments of cognition and practical action. 1 his can only 
mean the cognition and the shaping of the law — i.e. norms and system 
of norms — while the latter moment has priority. This is true even when 
law too is considered as an expression of the social relations, as a means
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to shape these relations, and society is ultimately interested in the deve­
lopment of the social relations and social values. Since this cannot be 
achieved without law, and since law also functions with a relative inde­
pendence, therefore society recognizes the social value of law and expects 
that a socially useful theory should have its impact on law through 
which a socially useful result is expected.
20. Our next thesis concretely refers to comparative private interna­
tional law. The essential point of it is that private international has no 
independent value systems. It is nothing but the summary or reference 
rules of law which are shaped by the legislator in each case depending 
on the substantive-law institutions presu med in their background, accor­
ding to the value parameters of the latter. This, namely that there is no 
such a thing as PIL-justness (Gerechtigkeit) but only substantive-law- 
justness — sounds albeit a little vulgarized. It would be more correct to 
say that a PIL-justness cannot be reasonably supposed except as the 
projection of the substantive law justness in conflict law. In the language 
of socialist jurisprudence this means two things:
a) Generally: that private international law should serve the uni­
form and “settled” regulation of the legal relations in question; the deve­
lopment of international (economic and cultural) relations; in the East- 
West relation it should serve the peaceful coexistence, and correspond 
to the nation’s international economic interests, further that it should 
provide a clear and logical legal set of rules in which the law will not 
slap itself in the face.
h) However, these principles are rather on a broad line both in 
case of codification and as to the high-level assistance to the development 
of practice. Private international law should achieve the point where it 
leads to correct solutions in substantive law. Therefore it must penetrate into 
the world of substantive law, as well as the social, economic, juridico-political, 
theoretical considerations and factors determining the former: e.g. into the 
actual material phenomena and each major determinant on which the substan­
tive law regulation is to be based. This is the only way to provide an answer 
to our conflicts law problems. Such is the socialist interpretation of PIL 
justmess (Gerechtigkeit). In the context of private international law the 
weight and complexity of this requirement will grow'. Its weight 
will grow because in a conflicts law position the impact of various 
substantive laws must be presumed; this is why it is particularly im­
portant for the legislator to create a conflicts law norm enabling the 
maximum play of the domestic-substantive-law Gerechtigkeit. And the 
complexity will increase, because the domestic substantive-law value 
system will have to be related to various substantivelaw value system in a 
comparative analysis before it can be expressed in the projected interna­
tional private law norm (rule).
Summing up: there can be no intelligent comparative private-law 
theory unless its theses rely on the substantive law institutions forming 
its background. Basically private international law is — according to the 
foregoing — always a comparative substantive private law as well. In the
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transnational law conception the substantive law-approach is equally the 
essential element. Not only because by the comparative law “boom” 
subsequent to W. W. II. substantive-law research activity contributed 
to the unfolding of transnational rules (Langen, pp. 20 — 23, supra. 7), 
but essentially because “the aggregation of ail those ru les.. ." which the 
transnational conception is offering are almost exclusively substantive 
law rules or solutions.
Recently, e.g., in the Hungarian literature the opinion has been 
emphasized that “let’s bring substantive law into private international 
law!”34 But that was another thing. This subnstantive-law opinion had 
been created and has consolidated under the pressure of practical claims. 
Today this thesis — being dissatisfied with the, for this or that reason, 
unsatisfactory “services” of conflicts law, suddenly brings in the substan­
tive-law regulations into private international law claiming that all 
substantive law rules (conventions, domestic laws etc.) which regulate 
legal relations involving foreign elements directly belong structurally 
(systemgemäss) to the corpus of private international law. Thus, this 
opinion is not meant to enrich the traditional private international law 
theory by the underlying or “background” substantive law, it simply 
wishes to include in the range of private international law also the inter­
national substantive law rules arising beside the conflict law corpus (all 
international conventions and agreements concerning international 
business and other related ralations). This, of course, could be regarded 
as a more practical question of name-giving or treatment, or as the fore­
cast of the future meaning that the concept and framework of private 
international law should remain, even when its original content has be­
come nearly extint because everything will be covered by substantive law 
structures. From the aspect of conflicts law however the problem is not 
whether we have incorporated the substantive law into the corpus (branch of 
law) of private international law or not. To deliberate on this discussion 
would lead us too far from our object. One thing is sure: the conflicts 
law constitutes a relatively particular agrégation of rules within the 
whole, i.e. within the said broader meaning of private international law. 
As it is: the two are found on different planes. The whole structure of 
conflicts law shows by its basically different juristic (sui genereis juris­
tic) identity a corpus of its own and by this if differs from the substant­
ive law rules applicable to international relations, particularly as it only 
contains choice of law rules and, therefore, its social content is determined 
by the domestic social phenomena only in a very indirect way, the alter- 
natinglv interfering foreign laws and their respective social content 
having a substantial effect here; and further the conflicts law possesses a 
general part, a general theory of norms (Normenlehre) applying to all 
special norms of the whole structure as, e.g. a mathematical coefficient 
written in front of an algebraic expression applies to all members of this 
expression. Conflicts law is never applved together with international 
substantive law norms (they rather exclude each other) so much that a 
binding substantive law regulation — provided it refers to the same
V02 F . M Ä D L
legal case — excludes the application of the conflict rule. Therefore, for 
the sake of clarity: the term “private international law” in this paper 
shall mean: conflicts law.
The problem is not that we have failed to incorporate the inter­
national substantive law regulations into the branch of private interna­
tional law but rather that we failed to bring in that substantive law whose 
answers we are seeking — and finding — through the conflicts law deci­
sion. We did not go close enough to reality. In order to be socially useful 
and correct also by standards of t he theory of science, a theory of compara­
tive private international law should be défendable also against the former 
objection, i.e. it must be reality-oriented through being substantive- 
law-oriented.
21. After these two — we hope, undisputable — premises let us now 
see what a right theory — a right theoretical approach — can consists 
of in private international law.
The postulation of a right theory, the clear definition of its conceptual 
requirements are frequently the preconditions for the correct and expe­
dient approach of truth and of the development of science and practice. 
The progress of natural sciences has taught us again — so Niels Bohr 
writes in his “Atomic physics and Human Cognition” that the kernel of 
progress in science often lies just in the correct choice of the theory, i.e. 
the definicions.35 I believe that this statement holds true also for the 
social sciences including private international law. A supposedly right 
theory is tried to be developed here along the following questions: what 
should be the basis of a realistic theory? (infra, 22); how to reach its 
completeness ? (infra, 23); is it possible to find a complete realistic theory 
in comparative private international law ? (infra. 24); what is possible and 
what follows therefrom ? (infra, 25—27).
22. 'fhe start ing point of every theory — being a hiarchized system 
of right or true theses — is that its foundation requires, first of all, that its 
individual theses (perceptions, judgements) be justified, be consolidated 
as objective truths (verification). This applies to comparative private 
international law as well.
a) One of the variants of this verification process is the axiomatic 
procedure. However, in private international law (as indeed in any branch 
of law) such an axiomatic theory or approach would hardly bring any 
useful result. How does the axiomatic approach proceed? Starting from 
basic concepts, general or presumably right theses, or axioms it develops 
these according to the strict rules of logics. The criterion of “trueness” 
bears here no direct relation to reality but only means a logically closed 
cycle. For instance the “correctness” of the four rules of arithmetics can 
be seen also by sheer logic. In order to believe that 3 times 2 is 6 we do 
not have to perform 100 tests with 3X2 apples in order to verify that at 
the end we always get a total of ß apples. Such an axiomatic approach 
will graduate into a theory when certain fundamentals are processed by 
deduction whereby a totality of principles deduced through impeccable lo-
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gics are obtained — forming, as they will, a kind of hierrarchical system. 
Such theories are known — justifiedly — in mathematics, logic, certain 
branches of economies where mathematics ]>lav a decisive role. Such 
theories are present and sometimes overwhelming (known as the various 
leges and other formulae) in private international law too, but in my opi­
nion no longer justifiedly. Of course: principles, axioms and logics do play 
an important role in law. However, ultimately, when we have to decide, 
which thesis is “true”, what is the “correct” solution we can no longer 
resort to pure logical axioms but have to rely on social, economic, 
moral or other value judgements. Even Kelsen who had built a theory on 
the formalistic-logical approach of law, will stress that “the law, the 
legal rule is a social phenomenon and not a logical category”.36 The same 
has been emphasized by Holmes much earlier when he said, that “the life 
of the law has not been logic: it has been experience”.36/“
b) The other road of verification: in private international law 
nothing but verification based on reality — as basic criterion — has an 
intelligent function. First of all because legal science is a reality oriented 
science (eine Realwissenschafl) in which “right” and “true” can be measu­
red only against reality, i.e. whether they correspond to the complex 
socio-economic and material relations — in general to the laws and ten­
dencies of social evolution. This will remain true even if we observe that 
the reality justifying the “rightness” of the “tru th” of a particular pheno­
menon may also be a definite legal principle generally adopted by human 
development. Such a principle can be, e.g., that men are (or should be) 
equal and all diseriminitaon by race, nation or religion is unlawful: or 
that in a socialist economy the overwhelming majority of the means of 
production is in social ownership; or that the economic organs of the 
state are not identical with the state itself: or such generally accepted legal 
principles which are the common legal heritage of humanity, as for in­
stance nullum crimen sine lege.
Even in physics (which can be formulated in the language of ma­
thematics) the verificatory role of experience is a decisive one. Einstein 
himself, who had operated with plenty of physical-mathematical for­
mulae and wrote down, with the intuition of a genius, his famous for­
mula E = m • c2 at a time when this could not be proven by experience 
or tests, has often underlined the overwhelming role of experience. Physics 
is a logical system. This logical, system — he wrote — could not be 
distilled directly from experience by inductive methods. Nevertheless, 
the rightness of the rules of physics (as a logical system) were exclusively 
based on the fact that its deduced principles are proven by experience.37
This is even more so in jurisprudence. There can be no really right 
theory except it consists of assumptions reflecting socio-economic, mate­
rial and related relationships, and their development — as the reality, 
a theory which consists of the totality of principles drawn from realities, 
empirical processes and general human heritage, including the intercon­
nections of all these as well as the systematical description of the laws 
materializing in the empirical process — transposed into norms.
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What does this mean in private international law — and maybe in a 
genera] sense too ? Approximately this:
1. One should define the possible types of legal conflicts to which the 
droit des conflicts des lois provides the rules of the solution. At this point 
usually no mistake creeps in yet. 2. In the range of the former one must 
go as far as the substantive law relations. 3. Next, one must examine the 
actual economic, social or other relation being at the base of the former, 
including the actual material process evolving therein. For instance, in the 
range of liability for unlawfully caused damages one should analyse 
the shift in the pecuniary positions after the damage incurred and the 
indemnity paid, the effect of other material conditions (e.g. insurance) 
on the victim of the damage and the person having caused it (the to rt­
feasor). One must ascertain whether the tortfeasor is left to his own 
resources in supporting the damage or whether he is backed by a great 
material power owing to a big productive capacity, or to a big insurance 
company, in which case he may logically easily bear the financial con­
sequences of legal norms of a higher level than by his own financial 
sources only. One must further examine how great is the actual preventive 
force of individualized liability within the range of compensation. 4. By 
a comparative legal analysis one should determine the kind of solut ions, 
offered by other, potentially applicable, systems of norms (as postulate 
of the former point 3.). In this comparative law procedure all those 
problems are to be cleared which at Langen started with the language 
and interpretation problems and ended with a thorough comparative ana­
lysis and a binominal rule us the endproduct (supra. II). 5. Examine the 
possible alternatives of regulation — in other words the possible conflict 
rules, ß. Examine the possible consequences of the application of each. 
7. Analyse and describe considerations (e.g. foreign models, legislative 
method aiming at simplicity or differentiation etc.) which under the 
given conditions may serve as points of view at the creation of the choice 
of law norm.
So far the reality: i.e. the world of statements capable of almost 
indisputed verification. Let us call this the А-sphere. Next comes the 
decision: i.e. the expressing of the international private law rule or prin­
ciple. Let us call this the В-sphere. As it is, here we encounter the aspects 
which can be verified hardly or not at all. including the tenets and beliefs 
of legal policy, their logical interconnection; viz. all elements which are 
part of the decision b e у o n d the fact that the person pronouncing the 
rule or principle is aware of the verified statements of the A-sphere with 
a conclusion indicating an optimum solution emanating from the A-sphere. 
The criteria of the decision belong to the А-sphere only in part, while 
the two spheres are linked and А-sphere has active influence on 13-sphere. 
However, in the В-process several variable, subjective and voluntarist 
elements (not necessarily in the negative sense) are playing a role which, in 
themselves, are also real factors. For instance, in the range of contracts 
the opinion of what constitutes the country’s economic interest; certain 
generally accepted organizational principles in case of corporations; a
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greater or lesser validation of the individual and general prevention in 
ease of tort liability on the one hand or greater reliance on compensation 
bv insurance on the other; efforts to keep Hungarian citizens domiciled 
abroad under the rule of Hungarian law in cases affecting the personal 
status, etc.
From the relatively own standing of spheres A and В at least three 
exigencies can be derived. First: when creating a principle or a rule of 
private international law — whether by a t heoretician as an indication 
for a rule, a judge, or a legislator — one must always rclaize in which 
sphere one moves. Second: in sphere-A one must always strive to clear 
the situation through well-verified findings. Third: in the process-B — 
i.e. at the decision — the optimum solutions deriving from the A-sphere 
should have an overwhelming role.
This, the comprehensive formula of the considerations outlined 
above, is what 1 would call a theoretically justified and practically 
reasonable — i. e. useful — starting point to the theory in private inter­
national law.
23. A reality oriented legal science theory — i.e. a theoretical app­
roach adjusted to the demands of reality — may of course achieve diffe­
rent degrees of completeness. This degree will depend on a) how far it has 
been able to verify the elements of А-sphere; b) how far and how exactly 
one has been able to formulate the individual theses, and c) whether the 
theses have developed into a coherent differentiated system showing a 
hierarchical sequence (i.e. general and specific laws).
Query: How far has the theory or science of comparative, private inter­
national law progressed within this formula? In order to give a reliable 
answer one should survey at least the principal theoretical concepts and 
statements under the said aspect. It is impossible to undertake this task 
here. Mainly, because we would be confronted with the said theoretical 
requirement, i.e. that the statements were to be verified. And to analyse 
all possible theoretical conceptions under this expections needed a volum­
inous book. However, I would venture to say that there is hardly a 
theory conforming to the parameters of our formula. There is hardly one, 
because — as far as I know — the conscious demand for the elaboration 
of a theory which would correspond to the outlined requirements, has 
not yet arisen in such a “formulated” shape. Of course, various elements 
of the former concepts or theoretical approaches, as well as the codifica­
tions of private international law will fit into the said system of require­
ments in many respects. The several connecting factors being well-for­
mulated theses of certain solutions will also fit in the formula. Similarly, 
in the same line: before taking actual decisions or declaring theses often 
the basic realities consisting of the economic and transaction relations 
have been well covered. And than it has to be emphasized that the trans­
national law adjudication process and the transnational principles deve­
loped by Langen (supra, 8), especially if combined with the specific 
principles of private transnational law of Ehrenzweig (supra. 15.1) meet 
quite a number of the requirements of this comparative law synthesis
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theory. But there are still not an ex post fad о projection of it. Ehren- 
zweig’s theory because it is very limited to that “narrow compass” and 
does not go sufficiently behind the legal forms into the social and economic 
background of the laws in question. Langen's theory because it too shares 
the lastly mentional flaw and because it anticipates the “aggregation of 
all those rules. . .” as a corpus of a transnational branch of law.
Accordingly, we may believe that there is no such complete theory 
which has been conceived under the banner of the said requirements, no 
complete theory where the respective elements of spheres A and В were 
consciously separated. Consequently the said requirements were not duly 
taken into consideration in the formulation of the individual theses and, 
thus, the level of the said riper structure could not be reached.
24. The question now is whether such a structural theory is at all possible 
in conparative private international law? The question is iniriguing because 
if such is not possible, then — following the foregoing — there cannot exist 
a reasonable, i.e. practically useful, comprehensive theory of private inter­
national law. Since the test has not yet been carried through, the question 
cannot be answered for the time being. However, I would venture that 
no such comprehensive theory is possible, at least not at any higher degree 
of maturity. The three criteria of a mature, comprehensive theory can 
only be met approximately in comparative private international law.
The difficulties will begin as early as in the verification process of 
А-sphere. Let us just reflect whatever can and should be verified there. 
Among others: the actual material processes underying the substantive 
law relations (such macro- and mikrostruttural elements of a given pheno­
menon the like of which I mentioned by way of the example of liability); 
the objective nature of the said material processes. So far so good, there 
is no theoretical obstacle. But it also should be verified: bow many kinds 
of substantive legal regulations there exist ? What do they consist of 
actually ? Since thereon will depend the decision belonging in the B-sphere 
on what kind of applicable law should lie prescribed by the legislator or 
should be indicated by legal science. In principle this is still possible 
though in practice it would amount to an enormous undertaking.However, 
even in principle it would be possible approximately only to verify in 
А-sphere (for any major institution of the private international law), the 
consequences of the application of a given, recommended conflict rule. 
This would be difficult even in principle, because even if I know the sub­
stantive law systems in a comparative processing, even if I know the 
underlying economic and other material process, and also the alternatives 
of conflicts law regulations — one factor is almost impossible to calcu­
late. Namely, what and how many substantive law systems will enter the 
picture of a concrete legal dispute depending on the contingency sequence 
of events of a concrete case; what can not be foreseen are those many 
variations of rèndezvous-н of the existing more than hundred legal sys­
tems, because these rendezvous-s may aeeur in a very wide a range depen­
ding on that contigencv whether the man I am hitting in a car accident 
was my own national or a foreigner, wheter be was a German, or an
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American, or a Russian, etc., wheter I caused the damage 100 meters 
beyond or within the Austrian border etc. If I take hundred legal sys­
tems, the number of their possible meeting variations amounts to power 
“x” of these hundred systems. What flows from each possible substantive 
law system — that much can bee verified. However, it would be impossible, 
as demonstrated, to pronounce with a general validity in international 
private law, what in a given ad hoc decision situation the actual conse­
quence will be when in the said meeting-variations the substantive law 
systems aie being connected by fixed conflit t rule. This situation may be 
even more complicated by the varying formulation of the prefixed conflict 
rule, for example by the circumstance that the conflict rule, under 
considerations derived from В-sphere (e.g. the desirable aspects of legal 
policy), may be a rigid or a flexible conflict norm.
Even a computer could hardly tell us what the actual volution will 
be in general and in each actual case. Simply because there is a constant 
unknown in the equation: namely that the number of variants of con­
flicts of legal systems depends on an inforseeable contingency. This is the 
stituation is in the verification process which would be one of the criteria 
of a possible general theory.
As regards the second criterion — the exact fromalization of the 
theses — there are also difficulties. There are of course many theses and 
maybe even more could be defined through an approximative verification 
process. The problem is, however: how do these theses relate to the 
more differenciated reality, i.e. the A-sphere. The theses we mean are 
e.g. the various connecting factors, or other general rules of the private 
international law like the rule of the “ordre public” (public policy), or 
characterization. Norms are necessarily rigid, while reality is constantly 
changing; since after the lapse of a certain time the reality will no longer 
be one of their criterion, the norms will start an independent life, bound 
to be partly alienated from reality and thus partially losing their value — 
even for the theory. They may become outright disorientating.
'l'he third criterion consists of the hierarchial and structural system 
of the well-formalized theses of differing levels. Obviously, the perfection 
of the latter will be questionable when the situation has been questionable 
already in respect of the first two basic criteria as elements of a compre­
hensive theory. All these somewhat discouraging conclusions will apply 
even more to entire branches of substantive law or to the comparison of 
entire legal systems as such respectively.
Well, this may seem rather dsappointing. However science cannot 
refuse to try to express truth without illusions. Jhering*s much- 
quoted phrase applies here, according to which: Looking for a uniform 
system of norms in law which would have similar or identical validity 
everywhere is tantamount to looking for the philosopher’s stone, while it 
was never the philosophers but the fools who set out in search of it.38
25. Still the matter is not quite so hopeless as it would seem at first 
sight. Despite the above defined requirements it cannot be disputed that 
the comparative law activity does have a scientific character, and in
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certain fields it does have the possibility of developing into a theory. 
On the contrary: in this reality oriented legal science approach the general 
legal comparison and concrete theoretical constructions may deserve 
very high points:
a) As regards comparative law in general, viz. the comparison of 
entire legal branches, systems, types: here the scientific advantage lies 
in those values which have been listed above under the first conclusion of 
the realistic comparative law conceptions combined (supra, 16b, 171).
h) However, we are more interested in knowing the actual impact 
of the said theory on comparative private international law. J take the 
liberty of anticipating the answers — two conclusions. One is the requi­
rement of the reality oriented legal science approach (infra, 26) in general 
in private international law. The second is the possibility of verifiable 
theoretical constructions particularly in the field of concrete legal institu­
tions (infra, 27). More precisely this means:
26. Even if at present there is no comprehensive theory in private 
international law meeting the said requirements and its very creation is 
doubtful: does it follow therefrom that we have to give up the ventured 
conception also ? Even when we cannot construct a comprehensive theory 
which would fill every nook and corner, it does not follow therefrom that 
we should not and could not make efforts to create conflict rules governed by 
the said theoretical approach.
This is obvious not only on practical considerations but also from 
the outlined theoretical formula. A reality oriented legal science theory 
can, namely, be an approximating one or may have, partly, a hypotheti­
cal character. For one: a theory will never jump out from somebody’s 
brain like Pallas Athene from Zeus’ head, but is rather due to develop­
ment. Secondly: even an undeveloped theory may provide a concept 
which can be utilized directly. In case of a hypothetical or approximating 
theory however, we have to be constantly aware of this fact and should 
not pretend that we have a perfect theory. We must always keep count 
of the fact that certain elements of our theory cannot be verified; that 
certain statements cannot be quite exactly proven but cannot disproved 
either; however, we can assume that our statements will be proven later; 
or else that a formalized thesis is based on uncertain suppositions etc.
Two conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing. The first is that — 
with the said corrections — the reality oriented legal science approach 
does have a “verified’’ basis, further that, whereever possible, we must 
strive at verified theses and reject the axiomatic approach.
The other: since concerning most conflict norms it is impossible 
to give all-round verified and generally valid norms for every contingency 
which would be always uniform and give optimum result from the combi­
nation of spheres A and В — therefore in legislative law-making one 
should strive at making flexible rules. Codification (in general: the theore­
tical or normative answer provided for each problem) will be on the right 
path when it enables differentiation, viz. realistic answers even in a 
sphere where the real elements are already individual and particular and
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therefore represent an actual variant of the possible multiplicity. This 
means that the legislator during codification should strive at delimiting 
only the major framework of the individual institutions by norms. The 
judge might be given a slightly wider “filling” role than — say — in case 
of the rules of the Civil Code.
This should be accepted as natural. One should rely on the judge’s 
getting the legal-political principles prevail in the wider framework given 
to him by an upto-date drafting of flexible conflicts law norms. Other­
wise — by prefixed rigid rules — also on the field of obligations the judge 
will be blocked in his efforts to come as close as possible to the forum’s 
policy and substantive value-judgement, i.e. the legislator would act 
against its own interests too.
If in the past, when e.g. in Hungary the conflicts law codification 
was lacking, we relied on the judge totally now we most not fear that he 
will be no good except to formally implement rigid rules. We have no 
doubt that the judge will be increasingly fit — both in interpretation and 
in creating supplementary special norms- to move in the world of realities 
and thus approach the optimum solution according to the above-outlined 
requirements.
27. In expounding the theory and its limits I have repeatedly stressed 
that the elaboration of a comprehensive theory was doubtful in compara­
tive international private law: i.e. for its entirety. Also I mentioned that 
the same went, very probably and mutatis mutandis, also for civil law 
and other branches as well. However, particular parts and instututions of 
private law supposedly come under another aspect.
Let us recall: what was the main problem which jeopardized the 
possibility of a comprehensive theory for private international law as 
whole ? It was the fact that, owing to the random chance (which is being 
created by contingent fact situation and the prevalence of nearly void 
conflict rules as regards substantive law values) we cannot foresee the 
substantive law which will ultimately govern the case. In other words, we 
are unable to verify adequately decided recommendations as a theoretical 
thesis: therefore it is hard or impossible to cast them into a uniform exact 
formulation, and therefore the systemation of these forms is also doubt­
ful. This, then, is the punctum saliens from the theoretical point of view. 
But what is hard or impossible for the private international law as a 
a whole, nevertheless with the possibilities as outlined above (supra, 26), 
that may be possible and feasible as to concrete institutions of this branch 
of law. From the just stated punctum saliens follows namely: if there 
were such concrete social, life and transaction relations whose internal 
substantive law regulation would be shaped by identical or similar deter­
minate, objectively fit to create similar substantive legal institutions 
beyond national frontiers and beyond the borders of legal svsem — then 
the proposed private international law norms could also be verified aga­
inst a less ambigous substantive law background, and this under the 
conditions of more homogeneous economic-technological processes leading 
to harmonizing or homogeneous snbstantive law regulation. If namely,
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by virtue of essentially identic or similar socio-economic déterminants a 
substantive law harmony(Einklang) is being produced and witnessed, 
then the following two conclusions seem justified. For one: substantive 
law comparative syntheses are offering themselves. And the other conc­
lusion: in the case of a highly harmonizing substantive law situation the 
verification of a comparative private international law thesis is also 
evident, because whatever the mentioned concrete rcndcz-vous variation 
of the different legal systems vill be, it is still the meeting of essentially 
identical or harmonizing substantive law solutions; and under this condi­
tion a well-defined substantive law oriented conflict rule can be ade­
quately indicated by the actual comparative law analyses and synthesis 
following therefrom.
Does comparative civil law — and through it: comparative private 
international law — have such fields or such concrete institutions ? No one 
disputes that there exist such within the similar types of law. Ho much that 
formed into a system (a code) they become common law. Such is e.g. the 
uniform law of the CMEA countries on foreign trade contracts called the 
General Conditions of Delivery.
Or sea the Bustamante Code of the Latin American countries, or the 
even more developped and important community law conventions and 
other common regulations within the EEC.
There are any “common laws”, i.e. conventions and other forms 
throghout the world within legal orbits of the same or similar social, 
economic and legal structure. These are really comparative law syntheses 
in the mentioned sense -  the demonstration and/or the product of them 
in the family of the same type of law, while under “type of law” legal 
systems with the same (e.g. socialist or capitalist) economic-social struc­
ture are understood. Ehrenzweig and Langen in their transnational con­
ceptions showed a substantial community of regulations concerning 
various concrete legal institutions (general and specific principles) deve­
loping in the harmonizing legal practice in the discussed concrete ques­
tions, as we could see, with regard to the analized developed capitalist 
countries (supra, 7 — 8, 15.1). From the socialist legal orbit too illust­
rations could be brought to show that in various concrete legal institu­
tions substantial similarity or harmony developed and can be witnessed 
also beyond the sphere of formal unified law like the mentioned General 
Conditions of Delivery of Goods of the CMEA Countries.
Comparative law syntheses and theories are. no doubt, viable and 
working within the different legal orbits of the same type of law, either 
as to single rules or solution-indications for one particular question or as 
to more comprehensive structures with a number of general and special 
norms hierarchysed into a closed system as a convention normally is.
But — coming now to the heart of the matter — are such syntheses, 
in supposed concrete fields of course, viable also between East and West, 
i.e. between socialist and non-socialist laws, given the circumstance that 
law is a reflection and superstructure of the underlying economic and 
soacial system and these systems are, socialist and capitalist systems, in
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their essence antagonistic phenomena? How then common syntheses? 
This basic principle of marxist legal philosophy was always the starting 
point when any attempt to approach towards comparative law East-West 
syntheses was rejected. As it turned out, however, this was a too simpli­
fied interpretation of the said principle: the application of a principle, 
characteristic of entire legal systems as a whole, without any differen­
tiation also to any possible particular rule functioning in the legal systems 
in question. The statement namely that in concrete fields comparative law 
synthesis theories are possible also in East-West relations is evidenced by 
facts and also supported by theoretical considerations under the said require­
ments.
a) A few facts by way of example. The 1962 conference in London on 
“The Sources of the Law of International Trade” was organized “with 
special reference to East-West trade” with attendence by persons and 
papers from socialist countries.39 Next, in 1964 there took place in New 
York the colloquy on the “Unification of the Law Governing International 
Sales of Goods”. At the latter, socialist writers contributed valuable pa­
pers on the comparative analysis of The General Conditions of Delivery, 
the U. S. Uniform Commercial Code, The Hague Treaty on the Sales of 
Goods and the Czechoslovak Code of Foreign Commerce.40 Without ad­
mitting an East-West comparative theoretical synthesis one could not 
imagine the affiliation of socialist countries to civil law or private-law 
treaties like the various agreements on carriage of goods by ship, bv rail, 
by road or by air; or the Unions relating to the protection of intellectual 
property; the agreements covering cheque and bill of exchange; socialist 
participation in the preparation of universal legal documents like the 
Hague Conventions on the Uniform Law of International Sales; the draft 
treaties on the peaceful uses of the outer space; not to mention the 
UNCTTRAL drafts: as a matter of fact the theoretical concept of the 
entire latter institution had originated from a socialist country, namely 
from Hungary. Or let us take an even more evident example, a symbiosis 
of regulat ions of socialist and nonsocialist origin: The General Conditions 
of Delivery of Goods of the CMEA countries has a chapter, namely the 
transport regulations, which incorporate many of the Incoterms rules 
into the corpus of a socialist commercial code of international rule. Twice 
two is four: all this could not have been done without the tacit submitting 
that the conditions of a comparative legal synthesis were given also in 
East-West relations in these fields.
b) In order to theoretically justify our thesis we might cite the 
following considerations. The regulations referred to as examples (or parts 
thereof) are such institutions in law where the national substantive law 
systems are to a high extent homogeneous: they are the projection of 
graual harmonization tendencies within the developed national legal 
systems which, although formally independently, come all very close to 
the desired theoretical optimum solution. This fact (i.e. the unifying effect 
of international trade) is rather generally admitted. Ehrenzweig sees its 
possibility in the range of the concrete institutions of a Law Merchant
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(Vermögensverkehrsrecht ) i.e. the property-commercial transactions (“eco­
nomic relations common to all laws”): thus recognizing the possibility 
of comparative law syntheses. He even adds that this was the resur­
rection of the ancient age’s ms gentium: the ins gentium had first been the 
law of the foreign merchants but subsequently it became universal for all 
participants of foreign trade.*1 Others believe, as already discussed in 
this paper too (supra, 5,12), that there exists a general lex mercatoria 
(Recht des Welthandels) which finds itself beyond national laws and legis­
lations, consisting of various trade usages, custom, general conditions of 
sale, so-called legal principles generally accepted among the civilized 
nations etc. cumulating, as it seems, in a worldwide prealer legem legal 
substance.42 Although lex mercatoria is far from being a general recipe, 
yet it cannot be denied that the international and national legislations 
and legal practice relating to international trade are showing a strong 
harmonization even on basic dogmatic questions. Many will say this and 
go evem further. “The systems of the laws of obligations are, at a certain 
level, mutually interchangeable — as e.g. Vischer says — therefore one 
may, within certain limits, leave it to the parties’ choice which law they 
want to apply for their legal relations.”43 While this is a little bit beyond 
the facts (particularly when applying this to the entirety of the system 
of t he law of obligations) it is nevert heless indicative of a strong tendency 
in Western jurisprudence and also characteristic of the actual trend of 
legal development. It is well known for instance, that before drafting 
certain socialist foreign trade enactments, which were not directly meant 
to apply to the transactions of the C.MEA, also the solutions ofcapitalist 
commercial law were taken as models.44
We could continue this survey of the literature. It would be for 
instance possible to prove the generally admitted thesis that, in a given 
field of law, or in the field of private law, the scientific value of legal com­
parison becomes manifest in the domain of the actual legal institutions.45 
However, in order to prove the theoretical justification and value of 
comparative law syntheses we must go one step deeper. This consists in 
the following. We have the outlined phenomenon: on the one hand the 
harmonization oriented various opinions in legal writings on the other 
hand the circumstance that in case of certain legal institutions the possibi­
lity of identical legal solutions hovers at everybody’s hand’s reach (i.e. 
a legal thesis — if you please: t heoretical t hesis extrapolated from various 
legal systems and generally accepted). The essence of this phenomenon can 
be expressed in that objective fact, that quite a set of institutions of the 
private law of modern traffic and technical relations, the how of their 
regulation is approximately similarly determined by the given definite 
level of the productive forces; in such relations the decisive role of the 
productive forces is of primarij character, besides the production relations 
which, generally, transfer the command of the procuctive forces in diffe­
ring (socialist or non-socialist) directions and forms conditioned just by 
these differing (socialist or non-socialist) production relations. In such 
cases the deviations of this origin are of minor importance — the equally
8 A NX ALES — Sectio Iuridica — Tomus XVIII.
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developed productive forces and production processes result in equal or 
similar legal regulations. This phenomenon is the ultimate source of the 
theoretical justification of the community of regulations and the viability 
of East-West sintheses with regord to given concrete institutions. This, 
reinforced by the interest of international commerce, becomes manifest 
in the growth of objective harmonizing tendencies in the law, in interna­
tional legislation and literature. By this here we have arrived to the basis 
fothesaid reality-oriented legal science theory, having arrived to the world 
of verifiable theses (statements, comparative law indications relating to 
positive law). The theses are verifiable because the fundamental material 
process and conditions, i.e. the factors primarily determining the law in 
the given field, can be grasped even though the conflict rules may send 
us to look for the background relations of substantive law systems of 
X-quantity; the latter will, namely, be objectively similar — apart from 
certain elements of the production relations and national traditions which, 
however, are not decisive in this point of view. This leads us to the possi­
bility of reaching the second slep which consists of casting the verified 
statements or theses in exact forms serving then codification, legal prac­
tice or more clearness in the harmonizing process of legal thinking. More­
over in case of a major institution the derived theses can be developed 
into a hierarchical order of general and particular rules, and through this 
we reach a living legal formula corresponding to the developed form of 
theory elaborated as above. Such is, in most cases, a private international 
law treatv, e.g. The СМЕЛ General Conditions of Delivery of Goods, the 
Ha gue Convention on the Law of Sales, or The Hague Treaty on Conflict 
Rules; but any other agreement — apart from a few exceptions.
The problem of how concrete'theoretical theses in the sense of the 
foregoing, can be actually derived in respect of a concrete legal institution, 
should now be demonstrated on some concrete examples — also in order 
to verify this comparative private law synthesis theory as a whole. This 
has been done in the said original Hungarian formulation of this theory 
concerning such private international law institutions as the parly auto­
nomy, renvoi, reciprocity, juristic persons, liability for damages:"* And ot hers 
could be ventured. But to deliberate on all these here would amount to a 
book almost, and that would go beyond the framework of this study. So I 
conclude with two observations.
a) Comparative law syntheses as outlined, syntheses of theoretical 
value cannot be created in those legal sectors and for those legal institu­
tions which are directly expressing (regulating, protecting, promoting) 
the differing constitutional, economic and social relations of countries 
with different social systems. In these cases, namely, the different-type 
national legal systems will be governed primarily not by the harmoniza­
tion trend motivated by means of production of the same level of deve­
lopment, but rather by the differences motivated by the different eco­
nomic and social relations.
b) However, in those said fields, where a comparative law synthesis 
of theoretical value is possible, the theoretical justification and soundness
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of such synthesis will stand. It will stand despite the fact that the self­
same theoretical thesis (the identical uniform norm, institution, or norm 
suggested to unification) may or will fulfil different functions in countries 
with diverging social and political systems.
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ZU PEN GRUNDFRAGEN DES INTERNATIONALEN l> RIVAT RECHTS 
Eine rcchtsvcrgleichende Synthese-Theorie versus transnationales Privatrecht 
P rof FER EN C  MADL
In le tz te r Zeit sind zu einer N euorientierung des in ternationalen  P rivatrech ts 
m ehr und m ehr neue Wege, K onzeptionen und Theorien erschienen. Der A usgangspunkt 
dieser N euorientierungstendenzen lag, bzw. liegt in dem U m stand , dass das traditionelle 
in ternationale  P rivatrech t den Bedürfnissen der m odernen Verhältnissen n icht m ehr 
oder n u r sehr schwer entsprechen kann. E ine dieser neuen O rienticrungstcndenzen ist die 
K onzeption eines transnationalen  P rivatrech ts, bzw. transnationalen  H andelsrechts. 
Dieser A ufsatz versucht diese le tz tgenannten  K onzeptionen und auch andere N euorienti­
erungstendenzen umfassend kritisch  zu bew erten. Dieser W ertung  folgt dann  der Ver­
such, eine rechtsvergleichende Synthese-Theorie. Diese Theorie in tegriert die realisti­
schen E lem ente der N euorientierungstendenzen, und ent wickelt dann die ’These, dass au f 
G rund rechtsvcrgleiehender Analysen m oderne N orm-Vorschläge zur E ntw icklung des 
in ternationalen  P rivatrech ts era rbe ite t werden können, und  dass das die hinsichtlich 
bestim m ter In stitu tionen  auch mit O st-W est W irkung theoretisch  gerechtfertigt werden 
kann.
U S  F . M A D L
К ОСНОВНЫМ ВОПРОСАМ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОГО ЧАСТНОГО ПРАВА
П р о ф е с с о р  Ф Е Р Е Н Ц  М А Д Л
В  п о с л е д н е е  в р е м я  п о я в и л с я  р я д  н о в ы х  i m e n ,  к о н ц е п ц и й  и  т е о р и й  о т н о с и ­
т е л ь н о  н о в о г о  н а п р а в л е н и я  м е ж д у н а р о д н о г о  ч а с т н о г о  п р а в а .  Д е л о  в  т о м ,  ч т о  
с е г о д н я  у ж е  т р а д и ц и о н н о е  м е ж д у н а р о д н о е  ч а с т н о е  п р а в о  с о в с е м  н е т ,  и л и  т о л ь к о  с  
т р у д н о с т ь ю  с о о т в е т с т в у е т  с о в р е м е н н ы м  условиям. С у щ е с т в у ю щ е е  п о л о ж е н и е  
п о в е л о к  т е н д е н ц и и  н о в ы х  о р и е н т а ц и й .  О д н о й  и з  э т и х  т е н д е н ц и й  я в л я е т с я  к о н ­
ц е п ц и я  т р а н с н а ц и о н а л ь н о г о  ч а с т н о г о  п р а в а  т . е .  т р а н с н а ц и о н а л ь н о г о  т о р г о в о г о  
п р а в а .  Н а с т о я щ а я  н а у ч н а я  р а б о т а  д е л а е т  попытку н а  о б щ у ю  к р и т и ч е с к у ю  о ц е н к у  
в ы ш е у п о м я н у т о й  к о н ц е п ц и и  и  д р у г и х  т е н д е н ц и й  н о в о й  о р и е н т а ц и и .  В  д а л ь н е й ш е м  
г о в о р и т с я  о  в о з м о ж н о с т и  в ы р а б о т к и  т е о р и и  с р а в н и т е л ь н о г о  п р а в а ,  и н т е г р и р у ю ­
щ е й  р е а л и т п ч е с к и е  э л е м е н т ы  н о в ы х  т е н д е н ц и й ,  с о з д а ю щ е й  т е з и с ,  п о  к о т о р о м у  н а  
о с н о в е  а н а л и з о в  о т н о с и т е л ь н о  с р а в н и т е л ь н о г о  п р а в а  могут б ы т ь  в ы р а б о т а н ы  
н о р м а т и в н ы е  п р е д л о ж е н и я  д л я  р а з в и т и я  м е ж д у н а р о в н о г о  ч а с т н о г о  п р а в а .  О т ­
н о с и т е л ь н о  о п р е д е л ё н н ы х  институтов т е з и с  я в л я е т с я  т е о р е т и ч е с к и  с с н о в а т е л н ы м  
и  в  р е л а ц и и  В о с т о к а  и  З а п а д а .
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